Nein, noch einmal!
Once again, European governments, administrations, business groups, bureaucrats and everyone else with a stake in the future of the continent anticipated with bated breath the decision of their people with regard to the revised Lisbon Treaty. If one recalls correctly, this was the treaty that was rejected via referenda in two of the founding members of the EU: France and Holland. Negotiations have been conducted, endless nights spent discussing and ironing out the details, definitions and ambiguities of the document. And yet unease predominates, suspicions permeate and the outcome is as uncertain as before.
Ambiguity is a tricky issue: those who value it seek flexibility, the freedom to choose a country's path as it navigates its way through Europe's complex tapestry of economics, politics and culture. As negative inducements are still more persuasive than positive benefits - due to the recent memory of the Second World War and the deeply-embedded wariness held between peoples - these governments seek freedom from absolute conformity, in order to ensure that it does not promise to sacrifice or subjugate sovereignty to the supranational entity that is the EU. Bureaucrats attempting to sell the idea of the EU as a sui generis organisation necessary for the development of capabilities to resolve transnational issues such as migration, crime and environmental degradation tend to emphasise the respect accorded by the EU to the separate governments regarding the freedom to implement reforms only when they believe their country is ready for it.
Ambiguity to the common European man or woman is, however, profoundly scary. If power is defined arbitrarily by un-elected bureaucrats sitting in Brussels - so goes the stereotypical demonisation of the Eurocrats - then flexibility translates into the uncontrollable volition of these men to dictate policies and directives that the country must implement or face penalisation. Ambiguity allows those who sign off on policies to avoid responsibility or pass on the blame to someone else in the hierarchy, and nobody can truly be held accountable. That is what the individual voter fears, and thus he or she demands that every single detail be ironed out such that the limits of how much bargaining power the EU and the government have relative to each other are circumscribed in black and white, as in a written constitution of sorts. One can understand why if the EU pushes for reform in the agricultural sector in order to pressure France and other countries to meet the Common Agricultural Policy targets, the farmers will surely demand how much compensation they are going to get, what happens to their farms, what the government is going to do to help them cope with the transition, what safety nets are in place and so on.
Unfortunately, the human capacity for attention is really rather short. The fact that the revised Lisbon Treaty is still lengthy tends to put people off, and so a majority of Europeans do not bother going through the meticulously defined conditions and prerequisites listed in the document. As mentioned in the article, people who do have the leaflet - which summarises the main objectives of the Treaty - are not reading it either. Some express disdain for the Eurocrats, calling them "crooks" - not surprising considering the common sentiment shared by most people that the EU political elite are just too insulated from the everyday worries of the man on the street. Technicalities are too troublesome to go through for most, and even though the bureaucrats have given the people what they implicitly demanded - that is, more details, the people now feign ignorance, admit to their laziness and cling onto convenient but outdated stereotypes.
Who is to blame? That is the game to be played out in bureaucracies and administrations continent-wide as the Irish have rejected the treaty by a convincing margin. Eurocrats are scrambling for contingencies that will render the Treaty more palatable for the Europeans, combating the relentless tirade of media outlets that will once again succumb to the temptations of doom-saying and panic-mongering, foretelling the end of the European dream. It is an uphill task, to be sure, especially when the trend to punish the EU for the failures that governments cannot remedy within their own countries continues.
Lest it be forgotten amidst the placard-waving, rhetoric-spewing of enthusiastic government officials in liaison with the EU officials, the predilection of governments in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in times of domestic crises, was to absolve themselves of responsibility by pushing all the blame to the unseen, elite bureaucrats of the supranational entity. Unelected, devoid of accountability, out of touch with the masses and craving for a neo-imperial Europe to rule over - that stereotype was exploited, manipulated for easy consumption and disseminated through domestic media outlets among other communicative channels, and it stuck. It has stuck so well that right now, people hold the conviction that the benefits reaped during the past two decades have been solely the credit of their own governments or themselves, and not the EU.
Lost are the acknowledgement and the socialisational experience of vesting one's economic and political interests in the multiple processes of Europeanisation, and governments have to retrospectively consider the repercussions of what past administrations have done to damage the credibility of the EU, and thus attempt to reverse the slide towards simplification of ideological opposition to it. The EU itself, under pressure from its member states, has reformed itself via the various treaties to be more democratically accountable, thereby giving governments a stake in its development. Yet much more has to be done in rectifying the huge chasm between the citizens and the EU - governments seem to have adopted the role of disciplinarian rather than facilitator in fostering ties between the EU and the common European.
Of course, the disciplinarian function of governments involves them basically arguing along the lines of "We know better than you do", thereby seeking to persuade citizens to volitionally accept the EU and to trust the government on protecting the interests of the citizenry as a whole. Sure, governments have portrayed themselves as the most powerful guardian of interests, with sovereignty as its weapon of choice. Yet how many instances has it been that the very same sectors which require readjustment or revamping to suit EU prerequisites are being heavily protected, due to its multiple links within a web of patronage that supports the political elite? While the ideational appeal of a united Europe may truly be burgeoning, and that its values being promoted are edging towards greater confluence with the core values held by individual citizens in Europe, not all decision-making by governments and peoples is solely governed by the invisible forces of socialisation via inculcated norms and embedded principles. Most of it still boils down to the essence of cost-benefit analysis that measures how profitable it is to adhere to these norms.
Hence, this competition between governments to out-bid one another in striking "better" deals with the EU will surely encourage the latter to accommodate these interests and result in widespread disillusionment with the supranational entity. What I propose is that European citizens should instead seek to establish parallel relationships with EU institutions, since they seem not to trust their own governments to protect their interests well enough. No rule in the legal systems throughout Europe has explicitly outlawed any attempt to bypass the government and communicate with the EU institutions. These ties may manifest themselves via either competitive regionalism - whereby the linkages between the sub-national regions and the EU are competing with links between the government and the EU (that is, attempting to circumvent) - or cooperative regionalism, which implies a complementary relationship between the EU, government and sub-national regions (the model put forth by Tanja Borzel).
In this scenario, citizens such as those in Ireland may create their own activist groups that seek to compete or coordinate their actions with already-existing pro-EU elements such as the major political parties and business groups, both of which inspire not faith but deep suspicions as to whether they value economic and political profit over the interests of citizens. These groups may then choose to organise themselves under a single grouping to enhance negotiating power and therefore seek to influence the decision-making processes within the EU institutions, thereby guaranteeing a stake in Europe's future. The EU must also convey the message that it is ready to open such alternative channels to citizens, thereby in a sense eroding the monopoly of negotiating power of governments. However, while this may seem unpalatable to governments in the short-term, they should realise that enhancing the complementarity and coherence of positions at which the people and the EU stand not only ensures that the democratic principle is being upheld vigorously (thus gaining ideational credibility for the EU in instilling its values), but also that the government can now count on the people to accept proposals and directives more easily, since they have already discussed and ironed out most of the contentious aspects. Lessened will be the fear and paranoia that exists today, tinged with the uncertainty that all that governments and business groups have worked for so long will be upset by one country, or one significant voting bloc.
Again, it must be stressed that this is easier said than done, since governments are liable to view benefits in the short-term, and value political expediency more than unforeseen, non-guaranteed long-term gains. They may view with utmost disdain efforts of the EU to erode the monopoly of bargaining power of governments even as they give citizens more say in the policies to be implemented. Less likely is the possibility that governments will allow any form of criticism aimed at their ability to protect the interests of the citizenry, because that is the essential raison d'etre of the state! Imagine what would happen if the government declared itself poorer at representing the people than the various interest groups existing at that time - that is plain irrationality that we should not realistically expect of governments.
Thus, we must keep in mind that these interest groups, aside from business ones, must be accommodated and persuaded by the EU of a stake in the future, one that does not exclusively cater only to those most agreeable with EU policies and directives, but also to those willing to challenge the viability and sustainability of those policies. Also, these measures aimed at democratisation of EU institutions should take into account the need to nurture the role of governments as facilitators, not disciplinarians, in the processes of Europeanisation. Lest it be mistaken, this transition is as hard for governments as it is for the peoples. Sovereignty of the government has been fiercely defended against the EU's seeming encroachment, yet the people do not seem to be convinced that this sovereignty is being exercised to effectively maximise their interests. The fact that the Irish still believe that their government can do the job of negotiating indicates that governments still do play a key role, and the public identify with it, thereby legitimising it. The Irish government and other pro-EU advocates should now seek to encourage the establishment of these groups on the street, negotiate with them alongside the EU, and therefore improve coherence of their position with respect to each other. The government should not squander this opportunity to prove itself as a worthy defender and negotiator of interests of the people to the people, as well as a trusted agent of facilitation to both the EU and its own domestic interest groups.
Ambiguity is a tricky issue: those who value it seek flexibility, the freedom to choose a country's path as it navigates its way through Europe's complex tapestry of economics, politics and culture. As negative inducements are still more persuasive than positive benefits - due to the recent memory of the Second World War and the deeply-embedded wariness held between peoples - these governments seek freedom from absolute conformity, in order to ensure that it does not promise to sacrifice or subjugate sovereignty to the supranational entity that is the EU. Bureaucrats attempting to sell the idea of the EU as a sui generis organisation necessary for the development of capabilities to resolve transnational issues such as migration, crime and environmental degradation tend to emphasise the respect accorded by the EU to the separate governments regarding the freedom to implement reforms only when they believe their country is ready for it.
Ambiguity to the common European man or woman is, however, profoundly scary. If power is defined arbitrarily by un-elected bureaucrats sitting in Brussels - so goes the stereotypical demonisation of the Eurocrats - then flexibility translates into the uncontrollable volition of these men to dictate policies and directives that the country must implement or face penalisation. Ambiguity allows those who sign off on policies to avoid responsibility or pass on the blame to someone else in the hierarchy, and nobody can truly be held accountable. That is what the individual voter fears, and thus he or she demands that every single detail be ironed out such that the limits of how much bargaining power the EU and the government have relative to each other are circumscribed in black and white, as in a written constitution of sorts. One can understand why if the EU pushes for reform in the agricultural sector in order to pressure France and other countries to meet the Common Agricultural Policy targets, the farmers will surely demand how much compensation they are going to get, what happens to their farms, what the government is going to do to help them cope with the transition, what safety nets are in place and so on.
Unfortunately, the human capacity for attention is really rather short. The fact that the revised Lisbon Treaty is still lengthy tends to put people off, and so a majority of Europeans do not bother going through the meticulously defined conditions and prerequisites listed in the document. As mentioned in the article, people who do have the leaflet - which summarises the main objectives of the Treaty - are not reading it either. Some express disdain for the Eurocrats, calling them "crooks" - not surprising considering the common sentiment shared by most people that the EU political elite are just too insulated from the everyday worries of the man on the street. Technicalities are too troublesome to go through for most, and even though the bureaucrats have given the people what they implicitly demanded - that is, more details, the people now feign ignorance, admit to their laziness and cling onto convenient but outdated stereotypes.
Who is to blame? That is the game to be played out in bureaucracies and administrations continent-wide as the Irish have rejected the treaty by a convincing margin. Eurocrats are scrambling for contingencies that will render the Treaty more palatable for the Europeans, combating the relentless tirade of media outlets that will once again succumb to the temptations of doom-saying and panic-mongering, foretelling the end of the European dream. It is an uphill task, to be sure, especially when the trend to punish the EU for the failures that governments cannot remedy within their own countries continues.
Lest it be forgotten amidst the placard-waving, rhetoric-spewing of enthusiastic government officials in liaison with the EU officials, the predilection of governments in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in times of domestic crises, was to absolve themselves of responsibility by pushing all the blame to the unseen, elite bureaucrats of the supranational entity. Unelected, devoid of accountability, out of touch with the masses and craving for a neo-imperial Europe to rule over - that stereotype was exploited, manipulated for easy consumption and disseminated through domestic media outlets among other communicative channels, and it stuck. It has stuck so well that right now, people hold the conviction that the benefits reaped during the past two decades have been solely the credit of their own governments or themselves, and not the EU.
Lost are the acknowledgement and the socialisational experience of vesting one's economic and political interests in the multiple processes of Europeanisation, and governments have to retrospectively consider the repercussions of what past administrations have done to damage the credibility of the EU, and thus attempt to reverse the slide towards simplification of ideological opposition to it. The EU itself, under pressure from its member states, has reformed itself via the various treaties to be more democratically accountable, thereby giving governments a stake in its development. Yet much more has to be done in rectifying the huge chasm between the citizens and the EU - governments seem to have adopted the role of disciplinarian rather than facilitator in fostering ties between the EU and the common European.
Of course, the disciplinarian function of governments involves them basically arguing along the lines of "We know better than you do", thereby seeking to persuade citizens to volitionally accept the EU and to trust the government on protecting the interests of the citizenry as a whole. Sure, governments have portrayed themselves as the most powerful guardian of interests, with sovereignty as its weapon of choice. Yet how many instances has it been that the very same sectors which require readjustment or revamping to suit EU prerequisites are being heavily protected, due to its multiple links within a web of patronage that supports the political elite? While the ideational appeal of a united Europe may truly be burgeoning, and that its values being promoted are edging towards greater confluence with the core values held by individual citizens in Europe, not all decision-making by governments and peoples is solely governed by the invisible forces of socialisation via inculcated norms and embedded principles. Most of it still boils down to the essence of cost-benefit analysis that measures how profitable it is to adhere to these norms.
But campaigners for a no vote mobilized under the efficient leadership of Declan Ganley, a businessman who argued that the treaty took power away from Ireland.
Ganley, who formed the group Libertas to campaign against the treaty, said that the vote would force the Irish prime minister, Brian Cowen, to renegotiate the treaty and secure a "better deal."
"We want a Europe that is more democratic, and that if there is to be a president and a foreign affairs minister, they should be elected," he said in an interview.
While the confluence of people's economic and political interests and those of the political elite is convenient, it is becoming less so as economic woes, accentuated by rising oil prices, are compelling citizens to raise their expectations of their governments in negotiating ever-increasing security and basically, protection from the efforts of newly admitted EU members to catch up to the core states in terms of First World living standards. However, extending security guarantees will only serve to increase insecurity for these new member states, and thereby poison perceptions of the EU in countries such as Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro, who still view Europe as a project worth investing their capital in. It is not a long-term solution to resolving the paranoia that people feel, having enjoyed a privileged status and unwilling to give it up to anyone else. It is also unlikely that it will be sustainable, given the democratisation of the EU's internal structures of decision-making and institutions such as the European Parliament, Council and Commission. These new members will be vociferously fighting against the efforts of older members to circumscribe the limited amount of resources available to the entire Union.
Hence, this competition between governments to out-bid one another in striking "better" deals with the EU will surely encourage the latter to accommodate these interests and result in widespread disillusionment with the supranational entity. What I propose is that European citizens should instead seek to establish parallel relationships with EU institutions, since they seem not to trust their own governments to protect their interests well enough. No rule in the legal systems throughout Europe has explicitly outlawed any attempt to bypass the government and communicate with the EU institutions. These ties may manifest themselves via either competitive regionalism - whereby the linkages between the sub-national regions and the EU are competing with links between the government and the EU (that is, attempting to circumvent) - or cooperative regionalism, which implies a complementary relationship between the EU, government and sub-national regions (the model put forth by Tanja Borzel).
In this scenario, citizens such as those in Ireland may create their own activist groups that seek to compete or coordinate their actions with already-existing pro-EU elements such as the major political parties and business groups, both of which inspire not faith but deep suspicions as to whether they value economic and political profit over the interests of citizens. These groups may then choose to organise themselves under a single grouping to enhance negotiating power and therefore seek to influence the decision-making processes within the EU institutions, thereby guaranteeing a stake in Europe's future. The EU must also convey the message that it is ready to open such alternative channels to citizens, thereby in a sense eroding the monopoly of negotiating power of governments. However, while this may seem unpalatable to governments in the short-term, they should realise that enhancing the complementarity and coherence of positions at which the people and the EU stand not only ensures that the democratic principle is being upheld vigorously (thus gaining ideational credibility for the EU in instilling its values), but also that the government can now count on the people to accept proposals and directives more easily, since they have already discussed and ironed out most of the contentious aspects. Lessened will be the fear and paranoia that exists today, tinged with the uncertainty that all that governments and business groups have worked for so long will be upset by one country, or one significant voting bloc.
Again, it must be stressed that this is easier said than done, since governments are liable to view benefits in the short-term, and value political expediency more than unforeseen, non-guaranteed long-term gains. They may view with utmost disdain efforts of the EU to erode the monopoly of bargaining power of governments even as they give citizens more say in the policies to be implemented. Less likely is the possibility that governments will allow any form of criticism aimed at their ability to protect the interests of the citizenry, because that is the essential raison d'etre of the state! Imagine what would happen if the government declared itself poorer at representing the people than the various interest groups existing at that time - that is plain irrationality that we should not realistically expect of governments.
Thus, we must keep in mind that these interest groups, aside from business ones, must be accommodated and persuaded by the EU of a stake in the future, one that does not exclusively cater only to those most agreeable with EU policies and directives, but also to those willing to challenge the viability and sustainability of those policies. Also, these measures aimed at democratisation of EU institutions should take into account the need to nurture the role of governments as facilitators, not disciplinarians, in the processes of Europeanisation. Lest it be mistaken, this transition is as hard for governments as it is for the peoples. Sovereignty of the government has been fiercely defended against the EU's seeming encroachment, yet the people do not seem to be convinced that this sovereignty is being exercised to effectively maximise their interests. The fact that the Irish still believe that their government can do the job of negotiating indicates that governments still do play a key role, and the public identify with it, thereby legitimising it. The Irish government and other pro-EU advocates should now seek to encourage the establishment of these groups on the street, negotiate with them alongside the EU, and therefore improve coherence of their position with respect to each other. The government should not squander this opportunity to prove itself as a worthy defender and negotiator of interests of the people to the people, as well as a trusted agent of facilitation to both the EU and its own domestic interest groups.
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