Conditional Transparency
Only the guy who isn't rowing has time to rock the boat.
An apt quote from French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre to describe the state that Myanmar is in right as we speak, reeling from one of the most devastating cyclones ever to strike this once-prosperous "rice bowl" of Southeast Asia. The situation is becoming increasingly dire as thousands of poor Myanmarese seek basic amenities such as food and shelter, and the flooding of the deltas implies that crops - already so meagre given the pathetic subsidies granted by the junta - have been ruined, harvests wiped out.
The diplomatically isolated junta finally decided to allow international aid groups and the UN to coordinate relief aid to cope with the aftermath of the disaster, an unprecedented move given the fact that the military has chosen to embrace its pariah standing rather willingly, relying on funding from China and Singapore to prop up the ailing regime. However, the lack of proper communications infrastructure and transportation routes will mean that relief aid cannot be delivered as fast as possible to the hardest-hit areas. I cannot even begin to imagine what the lack of vaccines from water-borne diseases such as cholera will do to the starving, homeless people of Myanmar.
The generals have taken a backseat approach to all of this, right from the moment before the cyclone struck (the state-run media failed to issue warnings that the cyclone was approaching) till now, apparently happy to let the international aid groups do the work for them. Now, in Southeast Asia, the relationship between state and citizen does not seek to emulate the Western concept of the social contract. Here, the citizen is obligated to serve the state, not the other way around. Yet governments in the region have been sensitised to the needs of their populations, knowing that without their implicit approval or acquiescence, the government cannot rule. Also, the key to domestic resilience is ensuring that the country's workforce is productive, taken care of and satisfied - the result is domestic legitimation of the regime.
Myanmar's generals do not seem particularly concerned about their population, mainly because it has found it useful to rely on external funding to sustain the regime, without relying on the population's productivity (which in turn leads to redistribution of economic power from the state to the people, thus this may empower them to lobby for political power) to continue insulating themselves from the prospect of revolution and civil activism. The failure of the government to address the fundamental needs of its citizens has degenerated to such a low level of depravity, yet the ideology of pragmatism dominates. As long as I don't have to feed my people, as long as I keep them near death so that they have to rely on the junta, as long as they are desperate and submissive, then the regime will never be threatened.
The US has decided to commit $250,000 to relief efforts despite its foreign policy stance towards Myanmar, and promised that more will come, but that it feared that the junta would reject the aid. This is certainly indicative of the US' own concern about the humanitarian crisis, and its vested interests in limiting the scale of destruction that might easily result in significant levels of migration from Myanmar, thereby inflicting costs on its neighbours, particularly Thailand. The latter has already begun to send aid to Myanmar to cope with the crisis for this very reason, while India has also sent two naval ships with stockpiles of supplies.
The diplomatically isolated junta finally decided to allow international aid groups and the UN to coordinate relief aid to cope with the aftermath of the disaster, an unprecedented move given the fact that the military has chosen to embrace its pariah standing rather willingly, relying on funding from China and Singapore to prop up the ailing regime. However, the lack of proper communications infrastructure and transportation routes will mean that relief aid cannot be delivered as fast as possible to the hardest-hit areas. I cannot even begin to imagine what the lack of vaccines from water-borne diseases such as cholera will do to the starving, homeless people of Myanmar.
The generals have taken a backseat approach to all of this, right from the moment before the cyclone struck (the state-run media failed to issue warnings that the cyclone was approaching) till now, apparently happy to let the international aid groups do the work for them. Now, in Southeast Asia, the relationship between state and citizen does not seek to emulate the Western concept of the social contract. Here, the citizen is obligated to serve the state, not the other way around. Yet governments in the region have been sensitised to the needs of their populations, knowing that without their implicit approval or acquiescence, the government cannot rule. Also, the key to domestic resilience is ensuring that the country's workforce is productive, taken care of and satisfied - the result is domestic legitimation of the regime.
Myanmar's generals do not seem particularly concerned about their population, mainly because it has found it useful to rely on external funding to sustain the regime, without relying on the population's productivity (which in turn leads to redistribution of economic power from the state to the people, thus this may empower them to lobby for political power) to continue insulating themselves from the prospect of revolution and civil activism. The failure of the government to address the fundamental needs of its citizens has degenerated to such a low level of depravity, yet the ideology of pragmatism dominates. As long as I don't have to feed my people, as long as I keep them near death so that they have to rely on the junta, as long as they are desperate and submissive, then the regime will never be threatened.
The US has decided to commit $250,000 to relief efforts despite its foreign policy stance towards Myanmar, and promised that more will come, but that it feared that the junta would reject the aid. This is certainly indicative of the US' own concern about the humanitarian crisis, and its vested interests in limiting the scale of destruction that might easily result in significant levels of migration from Myanmar, thereby inflicting costs on its neighbours, particularly Thailand. The latter has already begun to send aid to Myanmar to cope with the crisis for this very reason, while India has also sent two naval ships with stockpiles of supplies.
Now, the contradiction is this: why have the generals so willingly reported the actual death toll rather than masking it, given that they control the media outlets? Knowing that the failure of the government to effectively handle the crisis by warning the people and implementing some form of contingency emergency plan would be broadcasted, the generals still decided to come clean despite the political costs to the referendum to be held very soon. The truth is simple: if they chose to maintain the policy of silence and prioritise regime security over individual security of the thousands of dislocated Myanmarese, foreign aid would have been less than forthcoming, which would have resulted in swathes of Myanmarese dying from thirst, hunger or disease. They chose to be transparent, exploiting the altruistic nature of foreign aid groups and depending on them to repair the damage, and thereby preserving regime stability.
Thus, do not be fooled into thinking that transparency displayed by the junta was a shift towards liberalisation of state control of power, or democratisation of the subtlest form. Behind that decision lay the doctrine of pragmatism - choose to follow the rules when it suits our interests, but do not hesitate to override them when they come into conflict with our goals. One can wonder how long the junta can survive while maintaining this foreign policy stance, but it has served them for decades - the motivations that lie behind the decisions of China, Singapore, Thailand and India, among other players, lie entrenched in the common interest to keep Myanmar stabilised.
Thus, do not be fooled into thinking that transparency displayed by the junta was a shift towards liberalisation of state control of power, or democratisation of the subtlest form. Behind that decision lay the doctrine of pragmatism - choose to follow the rules when it suits our interests, but do not hesitate to override them when they come into conflict with our goals. One can wonder how long the junta can survive while maintaining this foreign policy stance, but it has served them for decades - the motivations that lie behind the decisions of China, Singapore, Thailand and India, among other players, lie entrenched in the common interest to keep Myanmar stabilised.
That the US actually offered aid is surprising enough, but it is also indicative that Bush and his administration have somewhat learned from their experience with North Korea. Adopting a policy of zero tolerance and communication, rejecting the proposal to send foreign aid to NK, but most importantly: having to rely on China to use its privileged position vis-a-vis NK to leverage for concessions at the six-party talks - all these experiences have socialised the US into the detrimental costs of containment, and the potential to build dependency and leverage within Myanmar by competing with China in providing humanitarian assistance. The US certainly seeks to wean Myanmar away from China's orbit and develop a more conducive environment within the country in accepting the potentially momentous event of elections in 2010.
How much China has committed itself to helping Myanmar tide through this crisis is still very much under wraps, as no specific information has been given. What is clear, though, is that China will not hesitate to emphasise the contrast between its own aid to Myanmar and those by the US, raising suspicions of the latter in attempting to influence civil society elements to adopt a more proactive stance vis-a-vis the junta. Whether Myanmar rejects or accepts US aid is thus very much dependent on the effectiveness of Chinese persuasions on the junta.
ASEAN, of course, has pledged to help out Myanmar as a neighbour and fellow member of the regional organisation, despite criticising it for its repression of the Saffron Revolution in 2007. Myanmar is poised to continue exploiting the goodwill of regional and extra-regional actors, all of which have interests in mitigating the consequences of this disaster. We should be unconditional in giving humanitarian aid because it is about saving the lives of our fellow human beings, that I do not contest for a second. Yet do we stop and ask: is it sustainable?
How much China has committed itself to helping Myanmar tide through this crisis is still very much under wraps, as no specific information has been given. What is clear, though, is that China will not hesitate to emphasise the contrast between its own aid to Myanmar and those by the US, raising suspicions of the latter in attempting to influence civil society elements to adopt a more proactive stance vis-a-vis the junta. Whether Myanmar rejects or accepts US aid is thus very much dependent on the effectiveness of Chinese persuasions on the junta.
ASEAN, of course, has pledged to help out Myanmar as a neighbour and fellow member of the regional organisation, despite criticising it for its repression of the Saffron Revolution in 2007. Myanmar is poised to continue exploiting the goodwill of regional and extra-regional actors, all of which have interests in mitigating the consequences of this disaster. We should be unconditional in giving humanitarian aid because it is about saving the lives of our fellow human beings, that I do not contest for a second. Yet do we stop and ask: is it sustainable?
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