The Disciple Becomes the Master
This resides in the core of the anti-Semite and renders him permanently damaged and weakened. Only the aid of a being much greater than themselves, Allah, can save them from disaster. Short of such divine intervention, they are doomed to remain defeated. The Muslim nations of the world do not see it as within their abilities to compete in a world of high technology, higher education, competitive open economies; no, they look to nuclear weapons, only available to them by virtue of their Allah given oil money rather than by the sweat of their own brows, to bring them relief from the often imagined depredations of the now conflated Jewish/American demi-Gods. 
Mogadishu faces bloodbath after bloodbath, but where are the cameras?
westhawk bewails the political indecision swirling around the Iraqi government, while listing the transitional Somalian government's tough choice of choosing to wage direct warfare against the Islamists despite catastrophic damage inflicted on the civilian population of Mogadishu:This description of Mogadishu sounds horrifying. On the other hand, Iraq would count itself lucky if its death toll was 200 in the last week and 1,000 in the past month. Iraq’s much higher death rate results from Al Qaeda and ex-Baathists ranging relatively freely over Baghdad and central Iraq. Four years of precise, intelligence-driven, “retail-style” counter-terrorism tactics have had no effect on the jihadists’ ability to conduct terror operations in central Iraq.
The similarities are indeed telling - Somalia, if subverted under the Islamists, would spell trouble for existing states like Ethiopia. Erithea has been backing the insurgents fighting the transitional government in Mogadishu, much like Syria and Iran sponsoring Shiite and aQ attacks in Iraq.
The casualties and human suffering in Mogadishu are frightening. But at least those casualties and human displacements are the result of an attempt to achieve a decisive outcome against the jihadists. If successful, the government’s campaign will result in a decision and then an end to the conflict.
One wonders whether the Somalians have a greater level of tolerance in terms of casualties than the Iraqis in this case: would it be careless to reckon that decades of civil war and bloody internecine infighting have conditioned Africans to accept the inevitability of bloodshed as a price to be paid for conflict resolution? Yet how can one deny that Arabs have been exposed to such intensity of internal conflict for just as long a period as the Africans?
Perhaps Iraqis have been conditioned to accept the regularity of assassinations during Saddam's rule, but not the bewildering chaos and unpredictability of sectarian unrest. In the past, everyone had the equal chance to be persecuted and executed despite sectarian affiliation; in the present, everyone possesses an equal chance to be mutilated and murdered because of sectarian affiliation.
Yet I do not for a moment doubt the Iraqis' will: Arabs are hard to put down, as history has revealed time and again. But it also implies that terrorism shares a symbiotic relationship with Arab culture, and will be just as difficult to extinguish.
fjordman opines about it in his essay; he speaks of the Muslim superiority syndrome - a psychological disorder symptomatic of Arab culture that history has unveiled; after going through Michael Oren's Six Days of War last week, I was shocked at the lengths at which Nasser and the other Arab elites generated propaganda during the war regarding Israel's losses in the air and on land - all this while the IDF was pounding Egyptian battalions and outposts. Despite the awe-inspiring swath of destruction inflicted by Israel, Nasser embodied the almost psychotic, burning obsession with revanchism that the Arabs were consumed with - the 1973 War being only the first of numerous explosions of conflagrations that erupted from this disorder. In Milestones, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb writes about “a triumphant state which should remain fixed in the Believer’s heart” in the face of every thing. “It means to feel superior to others when weak, few and poor, as well as when strong, many and rich.”
Exploiting this ideological fallacy and exposing divisions within the entire Arab victimisation narrative is crucial to the grand strategy of undermining the emotional, irrational appeal of terrorism, yet current trends in intellectual thought provide for less than encouraging evidence that leaders will seize the initiative in order to discredit enemies of civilisation and freedom. Instead, dhimmitude has infected the minds of the European elite and the Left with utopian concepts of cultural relativism and equivalence, so much so that a form of psychological infliction has emerged: binary characterisation of actors. Within this mental conceptualisation process, Muslims - moderates or extremists - are categorised under the victimised and disadvantaged, with the Western "oppressors" and "hegemons" on the other side of the divide. If one recalls Fonte's essay, this is yet another recurring feature of transnational progressivism.
“When the Believer scans whatever man, ancient or modern, has known, and compares it with his own law and system, he realizes that all this is like the playthings of children or the searchings of blind men in comparison with the perfect system and the complete law of Islam. And when he looks from his height at erring mankind with compassion and sympathy at its helplessness and error, he finds nothing in his heart except a sense of triumph over error and nonsense. (…) Conditions change, the Muslim loses his physical power and is conquered, yet the consciousness does not depart from him that he is the most superior. If he remains a Believer, he looks upon his conqueror from a superior position. He remains certain that this is a temporary condition which will pass away and that faith will turn the tide from which there is no escape.”
[...] according to Qutb, “What are the Arabs without Islam? What is the ideology that they gave, or they can give to humanity if they abandon Islam? The only ideology the Arabs advanced for mankind was the Islamic faith which raised them to the position of human leadership. If they forsake it they will no longer have any function or role to play in human history.”
[...] This Arab supremacy is underestimated by infidels as a weapon against Islam: “Part of weakening Islam is to show many Muslims that Islam was simply an Arab invention and export, a poisoned chalice that has lain low higher, and superior civilizations. This is likely to resonate especially in Iran among those who have had their fill of the Islamic Republic of Iran - that is, every thinking and morally aware person in Iran.” Ibrahim believes that “The West constantly goes out of its way to confirm such convictions. By criticizing itself, apologizing and offering concessions - all things the Islamic world has yet to do - the West reaffirms that Islam has a privileged status in the world.”
By conveniently ignoring the blatant, murderous transgressions of Muslim and Arab terrorists, instead attempting to rationalise their actions as corollaries of society-propagated pressures (that is, 'racism', 'Islamophobia' and 'xenophobia' charges made by apologists and sympathisers), the Progressivist movement is willing to compromise on morality, principles and conscience to recruit as many followers as possible. Alas, they do not recognise that these 'followers' aren't all that subservient and clueless, but are insidiously hatching clandestine plots to subvert Western civilisation and the Nation-State to Islam and the global Caliphate. In fact, their efforts at playing up the victimisation card can easily be counter-productive: Muslims and Arabs become ever more convinced of falsified accounts of 'discrimination' and 'thought crimes' against Muslims and Arabs and therefore turn more incensed towards the West; in addition to that, the Left grows more apologetic and blind towards the true intentions of their supposedly docile adherents; it becomes progressively easier to fool oneself with denial and instead seek solace in restructuring of the popular construct of the 'weak-minded Arab/Muslim'.
It would truly be a case of 'the disciple becomes the master' - tragically ironic.
(h/t sc&a) An article on anti-Semitism by resident psychoanalyst shrinkwrapped sheds more light on this issue:The anti-Semite necessarily defines himself as monumentally inferior to the Jew.
It's hard to keep a good man down. It's even harder to keep an evil one from resurrecting, it seems.
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7 spoke up:
Very, very good post.
Your remark, "..it also implies that terrorism shares a symbiotic relationship with Arab culture, and will be just as difficult to extinguish," is more than apt.
Terror is embedded in the cultural, societal and religious level of that society. It has become foundational, in terms of ideology and identity.
See my post, The Promise. I believe find it complementary to your post.
In 1996, Dr. Lawrence Keeley published a small but densely informative book titled “War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage”. As is so often the case with excellent scholarship, Keeley’s work was both anticipatory of today’s unfolding events (albeit unintentionally) and equally prescriptive.
___ [The] most important and universal rule of war: do not lose.
___In most cases, civilized soldiers have defeated primitive warriors only when they adopted the latter’s tactics.
___Primitive (and guerilla) warfare consists of war stripped to its essentials: the murder of enemies; the theft or destruction of their sustenance, wealth, and essential resources; and the inducement in them of insecurity and terror.
___Once soldiers match their tactics to those of their adversaries, their superior manpower, economic surplus, transportation technology, and logistical expertise – IF VIGOROUSLY EXPLOITED * -- enable them to win most such campaigns and wars.
___Defeating guerrillas is virtually impossible by purely military means; almost invariably, political and economic methods must also be employed.
___The fact that most guerrillas who lost either lacked or were CUT OFF * from logistical support by a larger and more modern economy highlights the only real weakness of primitive warfare and the decisive advantage of the civilized version.
___In may cases, primitive warfare requires LONG * periods of time—even generations—to gain its ends, whereas the goal of civilized war is the extremely elusive “knock-out blow”.
___A broad survey of warfare indicates that (in the short term or tactically) superior numbers or fortifications and (in the long term or strategically) a larger population and better logistics are the keys to victory. In fact, primitive tactics are superior, since civilized forces must adopt most of them—despite already possessing an often stupendous superiority in weapons, manpower, and supplies—in order to triumph over primitive or guerrilla adversaries. Remarkably, the armies of civilization inevitably suffer some severe and embarrassing DEFEATS * before these truths dawn on their commanders.
* Emphasis mine
All quotes, other than the first, are from Chapter Five: A Skulking Way of War – Primitive Warriors Versus Civilized Soldiers.
Great Post, Harrison.
Myanmar and N. Korea Resume Ties
s,c & a, thanks for stopping by and leaving your comment. I've read your post - in Arab cultures, to respect the sanctity of life is to go against society; a fate worse than death is life; the only reason for living is to achieve martyrdom. Such mantras are institutionalised and ingrained into impressionable minds day in, day out. When one defines himself as the opposite of the Other, he loses any form of self-identity or self-recognition, dehumanising the individual. Islamic and Arab societies have managed to literally convert the indoctrinated masses into bristling, seething hordes - existing only because the Other exists for them to destroy. And when that objective is rendered impossible through the disintegration of their societies and the persecution of firebrand leaders, they unleash their nihilistic passions onto themselves in a final act of sacrifice - though one knows that it is never 'final', for the ideological turbines of Arab culture continue to be fuelled by unmitigated hatred generated from this in-built fixation on death and destruction as their guiding purpose in life. Death to them is a continuum, life a mere glimpse into 'limbo'.
allen,
In most cases, civilized soldiers have defeated primitive warriors only when they adopted the latter’s tactics.
I've heard of those who employ the argument that to resort to 'underhanded tactics' would be to lower ourselves to their standards of morality. Yet these happen to be the same clueless appeasers who ignore the significance of incorporating sharia law into Judeo-Christian jurisdiction. Being far removed from the battlefield, these appeasers cannot seem to grasp the imperative that to protect one's morality, one must be ready to defend it - literally by physical force if necessary. Morality is not defined by abstinence of violence; to convince oneself of the futility of force as the most compelling method of persuasion is to willingly cede morality to those who would seek to taint it.
doug, glad to hear from you again!
Dear Mr. Harrison,
Could you please teach me how to filter out all of the "pop-ups" that inundate my computer after I check your BLOG? Thank you.
I learned much from this article and from these comments.
"All's fair in love and war" but the terrorists do not believe in love, honorable warfare or fairness. I was raised on the Golden Rule, but if someone attacks me, hit them back twice as hard. Politicians need to get out of the way and let our troops fight definitively.
I believe that de Atkine in Why Arab Armies Lose Wars, although describing combined arms and the problems for that in Arab Armies, hits upon the underlying societal values at play in Iraq under Saddam and for some period before it:
"Three underlying factors further impede coordination necessary for combined operations.
• First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs in anyone outside their own families adversely affects offensive operations. In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this basic mistrust of others is particularly costly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, at base, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership. (Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units, which throughout the Arab world have the same duty — to protect the regime rather than the country.)
• Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The `Alawi minority controls Syria, east bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi`a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the careful assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit. The same lack of trust operates at the inter-state level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel — that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when the vast majority of planes had been destroyed) — was a classic example of deceit. Sadat’s disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception that included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes). With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.
• Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority. They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler's whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable. Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are double-edged swords. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. Land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat to the same regime. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing."
That is part of the look at how to build the Mosaic of Iraq from all the pieces of information now available to us from a multitude of sources. In a combined context the Iraqi people have been so brutally manipulated over the entire length of Ba'athism, and some time before that if truth be told, that they have very little concept *of* actual government by consent of the governed.
Societal structures were so ingrained to the State that the actual ability to *trust* those structures, due to interfactional fighting, is missing in Iraq when Saddam fell. In places like Fallujah not only is it missing, but as far back as the 1920's it is described as *not being there* and Saddam, himself, never really could rule it beyond sheer brutal force. And even then, once the force attention went elsewhere, the only *trusted* unit of society held sway for individuals: the family. Not even the Tribe, which is what it is for the rest of Iraq.
The entire mess in Ethiopia/Somalia/Eritrea dates as far back as the Ogaden war, breaking down the social structures there, and prior to that as inter-ethnic warfare that dates as far back as to the Axumite Kingdom. The records of *that* demonstrate an inter-christian conflict based on ethnicity even before Islam was around. And the histories of that region point to pre-christian ethnic conflicts that go back at least as far as the Queen of Sheba if not *further* all the way to the First Dynastic Empires of the Nile. Before that you have no written texts... so guesswork is what is left.
Through all of that strife the social constructs of tribe and move to Nation have happened... with the latter falling and failing for some centuries only to return with the Western Colonial period. With that, of course, came hardening of boundaries and the older rivalries re-flared up, periodically. Thus the three Great Religions of the Book are *all* represented in and around the immediate area of Ethiopia: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Add in the near eternal ethnic struggles, colonialism, Nationalism and now the idea of Caliphate hitting there again.... ahh... were there *ever* simple days in that region? If you think what the Arabs are doing in Iraq is bad, that does not hold a candle to the very complex area of the Horn of Africa! The grudge match there is as eternal and victories of even a couple of thousand years are just mere stopping points in conflict, not the *ending* of them. The European Colonial period dashed through there in under two centuries, nothing compared to Pharonic Egypt! Or the Axumite Kingdom, come to think of it. Latecomers and interlopers just adding fuel to the fire and they are *gone now*, so back to the old squabbles...
Peace in the Middle East?
Child's play compared to *that*.
Even the Balkans are pikers compared to *that history*.
Folks holding grudges for 6,000 years if not *longer*. If the West can get *those two* areas to finally come to terms with each other, then it just might be prepared to look at Africa, where no victory in the Horn is Eternal, only the grudges are.
And that is only the thumbnail knowledge I have of the area.
I am sure folks would point to quiescent periods of a few decades to show otherwise... the merest 'quick breather and refreshment period' to these folks.
Iraq is far closer to coming to terms with itself than the highlanders, coastal and valley folks in the Horn of Africa have *ever* come to terms there. It is called 'traditional fighting' for a reason - the overt reasons may change, but the underlying ones do not. Get the underlying ones straightened out and then you *only* have the overt ones to deal with! Deal with the surface and you are not getting *anywhere*.
They will outlast you.
They snubbed their noses at Egypt of the Pharaos who *tried* to rule there. Where are the Pharaos? These folks *still* have a grudge or two they can dig up if they return...
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