The Possum Bistro

Soldiering on.

Having just concluded Thomas E. Ricks' Fiasco this afternoon, I'll just list the more salient points from the book while it's still fresh. Ricks provides a good account of the strategic, systemic mistakes of the post-war efforts in Iraq, the incompetence of several civilian and military leaders - supported by loads of anecdotes and comments from the guys on the ground. What he avoids doing - unlike the utterly shameless MSM - is whitewashing the entire scenario as a futile adventure (despite the title of his book).

To put it simply, it's a sobering piece of work that deserves a read. Here's what I found in his book:

1. The absence of Phase IV - the reconstruction plan that was supposed to have been formulated in order to take control of events right after the fall of Baghdad; Zinni and Shinseki both had serious doubts regarding this, but were obviously shut out by Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld
   
   
2. Bremer's disastrous to-do list, which he implemented despite advice from military commanders on the ground: disbanding the Iraqi Police and Army, de-Baathification which sent thousands of unemployed Iraqis into the streets (thereby contributing to the insurgency) - this was suspected to be a Chalabi-led initiative, shutting down of unprofitable state-run industries and thus further exacerbating economic problems.
   
   
3. Tangled chain of command, shifting of responsibilities, conflict due to lack of consultation between the CPA and the US military.
   
   
4. Failure to secure large dumps of weaponry and explosives (for fear of accidentally triggering off chemical and biological weapons), neglecting the need for border security with regard to Syria (one of the major suppliers for the insurgency).
   
   
5. CPA's souring relationship with the foreign press; lifting the ban on TV satellite receivers, but the CPA only began broadcasting months later - the time period in between left a vacuum of news that was quickly and effectively exploited by Arab stations - a serious misstep on the front of information warfare.
   
   
6. Mistaking the American public as the center of gravity, thereby painting a rosy picture of the declining predicament - when the real focus should have been the Iraqis, to win their 'hearts and minds'.
   
   
7. Abu Gharaib and the failure to hold commanders accountable, instead punishing low-level personnel.
   
   
8. The rift between strategy and tactics: winning the battle but losing the war; fighting the insurgency, not the insurgents; the people are the prize, not the enemy - a classic counterinsurgency point.
   
   
9. Maj. Gen. Mattis and the Marines, who chose to operate on counterinsurgency protocol - the Marines were to don uniforms different from that worn by Army personnel so as to distinguish between the two, and also to signal to the Iraqis a clean break from the past (referring to the tough, abrasive and trigger-happy approach encapsulated in the 4th ID's protocol).
   
   
10. The inevitable and necessary rotation of troops that would expose newcomer troops to the steady cacophony of gunfire and explosions, while negating all the hard work in establishing rapport and personal connections that the previous troops on the ground had already accomplished. New negotiating partners, coupled with the hostile environment and paranoia as to whom one could trust, would lead to frequent misunderstandings and miscommunication.
    
    Ricks opines:
    

    In a culture where social life turns not on official positions but on personal relationships, they were blank slates. And with a fast and constantly moving insurgency, where the enemy was quickly adapting, as well as operating on his own turf, anything that can be distilled into written knowledge is already likely to be a bit too old, a bit stale. The cutting edge of operations afainst an insurgency is the gut instinct that tells a squad leader that a street scene that appears safe really isn't, or the backlog of experience that allows a battalion commander to discern a new twist in what a sheikh is telling him. Much of that was lost when new troops rotated in. They were enthusiastic and hardworking but alien in the situation, while the other side had just gone through months of hard fighting.

    And don't get me started on the catch-and-release protocol which probably provided insurgents who survived the first battle case studies which they could use to exploit our weaknesses, flexibly altering their operational procedures to adapt to the situation. A dead insurgent is one less teacher to the others.
    
    
11. Hiring of defence contractors to train Iraqi troops: due to self-interest, indifference to cultural sensitivities and basically the lack of any authority to enforce how they worked, these contractors would at times nullify any efforts the US military had made to convince Iraqis that they weren't gun-toting, trigger-happy brutes.
    
    Also, the standard of training was sloppy, including the fact that contractors did not attempt to foster a sense of camaraderie among Iraqi soldiers, or respect for commanders that would lead them into battle - their thinking was still very much individual-centric, and they fought for themselves, not for their comrades, battalion or Army.
    
    
12. Kalev Sepp, a retired Special Forces officer, drew upon rich experience and extensive research on 53 counterinsurgency case studies to provide a rundown of the failures of the efforts in Iraq, taking counterinsurgency doctrine as a basis for comparison:
    
    
    • primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency
    • priority to kill-capture enemy, not on engaging population
    • battalion-size operations as the norm
    • military units concentrated on large bases for protection
    • Special Forces focused on raiding
    • adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment
    • building, training indigenous army in image of US Army
    • peacetime government processes
    • open borders, airspace, coastline