1.18.2007

Two to Tango


















In the stormiest tempest lies the rarest of hopes.

That evening, I caught Blood Diamond at the cinemas, and found myself impressed with the film and its lessons which we could draw from. The location in context was Sierra Leone in Africa, host to diamond smugglers, warlords, militias and rebels who pillage and plunder at the expense of the defenseless locals, who wish of nothing but to live in peace. Yet the supposed guarantor of such security wields no such sovereignty or power - the government is unable to harness the necessary forces required to purge Sierra Leone of these scourges of the earth.

Militias hop from village to village, slaughtering all they see, employing extreme violence and coercion to prevent or punish those who vote and support the government. Those who are physically strong and able to work are recruited as slaves at the diamond mines. Smugglers sell the diamonds to neighbouring countries, who then through payment finance and fuel the ongoing cycle; these countries sell the diamonds to key figures in countries like Britain - then, by keeping supply low (storing these diamonds in safe vaults) while demand increases as husbands fork out exorbitant amounts of cash to buy those pretty diamond rings in display windows along the shopping avenues - the civil war has thus presented a win-win situation for each participant to keep it going as long as it can: profiteering at its bloodiest.

A scene in the film struck me as prescient: an old man was lamenting that if oil was ever discovered in Africa, it would be absolutely catastrophic for its population.

Which brings me to the seemingly depressing parallel of Iraq - or so defeatists would want you to believe. Contrary to the level of sectarian conflict and internecine infighting between sects that is the time-honoured legacy of tribalism in the Arab world, neither side has successfully mobilised an organised fighting force, or in possession of the reins of one or few arms of government.

Oil resources have not been siphoned off in pipelines to Iran and Saudi Arabia to be channelled back manifold to fund the proxy Foreign Legions of Iran - namely, Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army - and aQ insurgents in Iraq. Indoctrination of children into child-soldiers ala Sierra Leone or even Palestine for that matter has not happened - or at least not reported - yet.

The government of Maliki had been quiescent for too long, but now has the political freedom to act against the Sadrists without fear of parliamentary collapse - Iraqi politicians are grudgingly accepting of Bush's latest effort to secure Iraqi neighbourhoods, and obviously sense a shift of power in their favour should a vacuum present itself in the form of the Sadrists' departure. He also has the best military force in the world supporting the Iraqi Army - logistical, auxillary, intel, technology, counter-insurgency training - which should in no circumstances be discounted to accomplish what should be accomplished for the sake of our long-term interests.

al-Sadr is currently avoiding confrontation with US and Iraqi troops, knowing very well that his immunity is uncertain now that firstly, his influence on the Shiite militias is tenuous at best (thus, they might not heed al-Sadr's advice and instead head on out to engage the Iraqi Army - and in the process get slaughtered, also giving us an idea where he is and a viable casus belli to raid the hidey-holes) and thus his Mahdi Army might well be whittled down with time; secondly, by waiting the "surge" out, the Iraqi Army is free to secure all other neighbourhoods, encircling Sadr City and Diwaniya in the process. With checkpoints, zone patrols and documentation of arms and personnel transferring in and out of these internal borders, the Sadrists will find that being boxed in is not going to be very fun at all.

al-Hakim's loyalties lie with Iran - that has been obvious - but now he is compelled to think of Iraq first, Iran second. If Maliki dares to move against the largest parliamentary majority, who is to guarantee he will not act upon the anti-Persian sentiment and purge the Badrists, who are even less of a political and military power in Iraq? With the aircraft carriers being deployed near Iranian straits, Bush's speech possibly hinting at an air/naval assault on oil and gas pipelines in Iran, no longer will Iran be able to play this game of brinkmanship without considering the almost cataclysmic aftermath of an economic collapse. Close the Straits of Hormuz, you say?

Sunni insurgents have expressed their interest in cutting a deal with us - no reconciliation, no violence; in addition to that, they will agree to work with the Anbar tribes to flush out aQ insurgents. Already this week, four more Ramadi tribes have switched. Our strategy is increasingly being vindicated, the rapport established, now reinforced by Bush's initiative to get tough with Shiite militias. The various personal accounts of Sunnis fighting the Shiites instead of Americans all signify a certain glimmer of hope that perhaps something workable can be engendered from the continuation of tribal engagement.

The Kurds have decided to chip in, and substantially so - Shiites will soon realise that the alternative to Kurdish cooperation is secession, which means the forging of Kurdistan, and with it the deprivation of Kirkuk and its oil revenues. al-Sadr's attempts to instigate fellow co-religionists to rebuff the Kurdish forces will be in vain: for one, the Kurds could teach the Shiites and Sunnis a thing or two about protecting their provinces. Iran and Turkey will be more cautious in addressing the Kurds, for an autonomous Kurdistan represents the major threat to their societies and governments.

Oil companies are gradually beginning to establish contracts in Iraq; life for Iraqi citizens - yes, no longer subjects under a dictator - has become increasingly better, though it is a tough, bitter struggle day-by-day against the multiple currents of sectarianism, tribalism and corruption that are threatening to render Iraq asunder.

The sobering reality of the situation cannot be further emphasised - but the destructiveness and self-defeating corollaries that will be engendered from our withdrawal from Iraq obviously needs much, much underscoring.

We are at the brink of a new epoch for Iraq - countervailing forces of anti-interventionist, anti-Persian, anti-insurgent sentiments are empowering the beseiged Iraqis with a sliver of hope for a nation of their own. They have known no cause for nationalism before this: history? Of oppression. Culture? Of fear and paranoia. Religion? Definitely not.

To grasp this rare opportunity, an even rarer confluence of events must take place: Bush has taken the crucial step towards empowering the Iraqi government and standing up to Iran - now he must consider how to win back public opinion on the domestic front and ward of the circling vultures of Congress; similarly, the onus is on Maliki to act decisively against militias and insurgents, proving not primarily to Bush but to the Iraqis that the government is to be trusted to protect their lives, liberties and properties.

It takes two hands to clap. Will we hear it before apocalypse descends on Iraq?

4 spoke up:

Wu Wei said...

To me the biggest question is the Sunnis. Apparently they favor a truce with the US now.

But they reject every aspect of society and the government. They are still letting Al Qaeda car bomb Shiite civilians. Will the Sunnis provide police in Baghdad?

That is the issue all over, who do the US & Iraqi Army give control to during the "hold" phase? During the clear phase there will be Kurdish Iraqi Army troops in Sunni areas. Will the (Arab) Sunnis police their neighborhood? If they do so, will they also "cleanse" mixed neighborhoods of Shiites in their spare time?

Will Sunnis begin joining the Army? (US Marines are having success in getting Sunni police & some army recruits in Anbar.) Will the Sunnis really give up their dream of being the top dog in Iraq again?

So to me the clear & hold operation seems like it will work, but there is no one to pass control to. In the Shiite areas we would be handing Sadr City right back to al-Sadr.

rufus said...

Great Post, Harrison. Next time, pick a day when "Blogger" is working a little bit better.

:)

Harrison said...

wu wei, thank you for your input.

I believe that the Sunni insurgents are being sincere in considering a truce with us, in that with the momentum of the situation shifting in favour of the Iraqi government and the defaulting of the Ramadi and Anbar tribes, they realise that this is their only chance of actually being able to be incorporated back into Iraqi society without being ethnically purged or persecuted by the government.

More importantly, even though they may "reject every aspect of society and the government", neither we nor the Iraqi government are significantly dependent on them for political support. Therefore, though they may be opposed to the entire system of governance, the Sunnis are in no position to subvert democracy and manipulate the system in their favour. Maliki always has the easy option of sending the Iraqi Army and Police to take care of any Sunni insurgents - that is the responsibility of government, not sectarianism at work.

This is unlike in Weimar Germany when the Republic and centrist coalition had to rely overwhelmingly on the old order: the militarists, authoritarian generals and anti-democracy statists, embodied in the forms of Luderndoff and Hindenburg. Then, both the left (KDP, SPD) and the right (the Harzburg front) were vehemently opposed to the democratic system and sought to undermine it. They succeeded because they represented the only majorities in parliament, and therefore had the power to subvert democracy via, ironically, democracy itself.

As long as Sunni insurgents reject the political process, they will continue to do so to their detriment. Perhaps they have realised that their best alternative now is to accept an armistice. Their pride is important to them - they have defiantly pointed out that they want to have nothing to do with Shiites, be it the Army or Police. But with the tribes switching over, so will moderate Sunnis - the tribalism of Arab societies seems to imply this. Without popular support from the grassroots level, how can the Sunni insurgents even begin to contemplate a predicament where sanctuary is scarce, and when nobody believes in their struggle to actually support them?

We will keep the door open to the insurgents. Soon, they will realise that this is their only chance to gain back the trust of their tribal allies, to gain back the respect of their co-religionists in Iraq, and perhaps even to have a significant say in how Sunni affairs should be handled in parliament in the future. Soon, they will realise that aQ is a lost cause in Iraq, and the faster they dissociate themselves with KSA, the better their chances for reintegration back into the Sunni portion of the Iraqi population.

rufus, thank you for visiting again!

Wu Wei said...

> neither we nor the Iraqi government are significantly dependent on them for political support.

Well, Saudi Arabia and many other Sunni countries are putting great pressure on us to defend the Iraqi Sunnis. They have threatened to invade Iraq themselves if we leave.

The question is not political support but the ability of the insurgency to undercut the government and force civil war if it continues. One of the main tactics of the insurgency is to destroy the infrastructure of the country, oil facilities, electricity, water, police... One main reason Baghdad is in chaos is because the Sunni Resistance constantly destroys any progress that is made to improving the Iraqi economy and infrastructure.

> Maliki always has the easy option of sending the Iraqi Army and Police to take care of any Sunni insurgents

But since the Iraqi Army is all Shiite (and Kurd) with no Sunnis, then isn't sending them against the Sunnis civil war?

That is yet another example of how government won't work without participation of the Sunnis. Anti-war advocates argue Maliki's government is illegitimate because it has so few Sunnis. Yet the Sunnis are the ones who continually slaughter civilians and government officials every day, and refuse to participate in society.

Some of the Sunni Insurgents have agreed to a deal, but maybe not all of them. And is the deal simply that they'll cease fire against the US so that they can attack the Shiites? I don't see any indication from Maliki or the Sunni Resistance that they are interested in a long term peace, or that those discussion are far along.