A Sliver of Hope in a Silver Lining
Initially, this rather intriguing event caught my eye: In response to this, I posted at the BC then: In light of this, any person who still vehemently believes that Iran has nothing to do with what's happening in Iraq, or is somehow non-complicit in endangering Iraqi sovereignty should be summarily dismissed as naive, ignorant and utterly incompetent. Just recently, evidence that Hezbollah (a Foreign Legion of the Iranians) has been paying Palestinian terrorists from Islamic Jihad to fire Qassams at Israeli targets. Baker and Gates had better remove their rose-tinted glasses, while Bush - though buoyed by the promise of a surge of questionable benefit - is just as unwilling to clearly and unambiguously define our enemy in Iraq. Either way, it seems to me that Sistani intends to play the nationalists against the Iranian sympathisers to manifest a fragile balance of terror, while grudgingly accepting the status quo of the steady radicalisation of the Sunnis (which would conveniently provide casus belli for ethnic cleansing).
Holding out a glimmer of hope.
It seems to me that the current situation in Iraq is just as convoluted in logic as well as execution; a series of controversial events had manifested in the preceding weeks that promised decisive shifts in our policy in Iraq, while the impending "surge" has been debated and discussed at various fora in the blogosphere.U.S. military forces in Baghdad have apprehended four Iranian nationals in Baghdad. U.S. forces stopped a convoy in Baghdad and took away two Iranian diplomats. After some questioning, the Americans turned the two Iranian diplomats over to Iraqi government officials, who released the men.
In a second and far more dramatic action, U.S. soldiers raided the compound of Mr. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of SCIRI, the largest Shi’ite political party in Iraq. The American soldiers took away two Iranians, said to be high-ranking officers in Iran’s Al Quds force, a special intelligence division of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. In addition to the two men, the Americans took away numerous documents. Within Mr. al-Hakim’s compound, this seizure took place in the home of Mr. Hadi al-Ameri, the chairman of the Iraqi Parliament’s security committee and leader of the Badr Organization, the armed wing of Mr. al-Hakim’s political party. These two Iranians and the documents discovered with them apparently remain in the custody of the American military command.
Perhaps Bush is finally beginning to see that speaking to Iran without force to back it up is ineffectual, and to detain the Iranians despite protests from the Iraqi government - which has been extraordinarily quiescent with foreign agents of dubious, even insidious, intent - represents a slight shift in the approach towards dealing with Iran.
The lack of further measures or rhetoric from the Iraqi government suggests that Sistani and al-Sadr are only all too happy to see al-Hakim and the Iranians humiliated; after all, Sistani wants to preserve Shiite unity, and his reluctance to back the anything-but-Sadr coalition seems to show that he is willing to acquiesce with the Sadrists if it would ensure our withdrawal. Not to mention that al-Sadr desires for the Badrists to be sidelined, since he views them as a threat to Iraqi sovereignty.
Then the Iranians were released (h/t Westhawk), despite this being made known to us:According to this story from the Washington Post (h/t The Fourth Rail), the U.S. military command in Baghdad now confirms that the two Iranians captured at the al-Hakim compound were members of Iran's al-Quds Brigade, an Iranian special intelligence unit. One of the Iranians, a certain Chizari, is the third-highest ranking officer in al-Quds. The Iraqi government has expelled the two men from its territory.
The documents seized with the men were "weapons lists, documents pertaining to shipments of weapons into Iraq, organizational charts, telephone records and maps, among other sensitive intelligence information," including information about shaped-charge explosives.
The article mentions that Mr. al-Hakim, who met with President Bush a few weeks ago, cooperated with the U.S. military operation on his compound.
This episode damages U.S. confidence in Mr. al-Hakim and other Shi'ite parties the U.S. may have thought to be cooperative with its interests. And from a Sunni perspective, their suspicions about an Iranian takeover of Iraq have been confirmed; political reconciliation is now likely farther away than ever.
But the U.S. government is not blameless. Its stubborn insistence on political reconciliation and counterinsurgency, coupled with America's reputation for leaving allies in the lurch, has only encouraged Iraq's Shi'ites to hedge their bets by taking assistance from their former sponsors. The U.S. would stand a better chance of cutting off Iranian intervention in Iraq if it would firmly side with the Shi'ite/Kurdish majority, as we have persistently recommended. This episode shows that it may be too late for this choice.
I had held out hope that by rebuffing al-Hakim and humiliating him in the process, perhaps it would send a clear signal that we will not tolerate Iranian intervention in Iraq, and that SCIRI's cooperation and stake in the new coalition to alienate the Sadrists can never be exploited to hold us hostage to choose between two equally unpalatable outcomes: Iraq a proxy of Iran, or militia-run Sadrist Iraq.
Sistani had contemplated the idea of the coalition, yet obviously the reluctance to split the Shiite bloc has pointed him in the direction of acquiescing with al-Sadr and Hakim - to Sistani, only the unity of the Shiites can result in the speedier withdrawal of our troops from Iraq, thus he is willing to risk both the radicalisation of Shiites under the Sadrists, as well as possible Iranian infiltration by SCIRI - probably because he does not wield necessary clout to dilute Iranian influence.The Sunni protests, which appeared to be building, could signal a spreading militancy. Sunnis were outraged by Mr. Hussein’s hurried hanging on Saturday, just four days after an appeals court upheld his conviction and sentence, and many were incensed by the unruly scene in the execution chamber, captured on a cellphone, in which Mr. Hussein was taunted with chants of “Moktada! Moktada! Moktada!” — the name of the Shiite who runs one of Iraq’s most violent militias.
The dictator's execution was necessary, though one would question the timing - it should have been much, much sooner than later. Without Hussein languishing in his cell and making a farce out of the trial, instigating assassinations of judges and the like, the Baathists would have perhaps reconsidered their position and edged towards reconciliation. The strategy of flushing out the dedicated aQ insurgents and enlisting the aid of Sunni tribes such as those in Anbar would have worked sooner if the only glimmer of hope for the Baathists were to be extinguished earlier. Now even the trust of the Anbar tribes are at risk of being squandered away.
Marc Schulman remarks that:Burns adds that "American officials in Iraq have been reluctant to say much publicly about the pell-mell nature of the hanging, apparently fearful of provoking recriminations in Washington, where the Bush administration adopted a hands-off posture, saying the timing of the execution was Iraq's to decide." This is illustrative of the "double bind" that has ensnared the U.S. over the Maliki government — "frustrated at what they call the government's failure to recognize its destructive behavior, but reluctant to speak out, or sometimes to act, for fear of undermining Mr. Maliki and worsening the situation."
Undermining Maliki's authority should not be a problem for us - personally, Maliki mirrors Sistani in that both have displayed their penchant for tolerance of agents of al-Sadr and al-Hakim. Even though strengthening the government is key to establishing security and political stability in the long term, Maliki has proven that he is just as insincere as Sistani, as seen by the Iraqi government's protests at the Iranians being detained by our troops.
All this bluster surrounding the hypothesis that Maliki and Sistani are our allies in Iraq, that by detaining the Iranians we would be risking what little political capital we have in order to gain leverage in this predicament - how much of it is true? Sistani seduced us with the possibility of an anti-Sadrist coalition, yet that would entail staying quiescent about al-Hakim's ties to Iran; when Bush tried to stand up to the threat of Iranian infiltration, Maliki manouevred the government against us - this despite the fact that we were already geared towards a scenario whereby Sadrist influence would not be sufficient to dilute government sovereignty.
All this leads me to posit that reconciliation with the Shiites must entail not the maintenance of the Shiite alliance but the dissolution of it: by keeping Maliki, Sistani, al-Sadr and al-Hakim in this comfortable status quo, we are allowing them to manipulate us back and forth, portraying us as meddlers and enemies of the state.
To Maliki: With our help, you will crack down on the militias. We will provide logistical and QRF support to the Iraqi Army and Police, assist in enforcing the Iran-Iraq border security; in exchange, you must publicly rebuff any form of compromise that could possibly present the threat of Iranian interference (most likely through SCIRI and al-Hakim). Sistani is powerless to stop the Sadrists from establishing a monopoly on political power, so we are the only safeguard against the dilution of your power - and your eventual demise at the hands of al-Sadr.
To al-Hakim: Just to make it clear, we are not interested in negotiating with Iran; we know all too well your involvement with the Iranians, and SCIRI is no less guilty of compromising Iraqi sovereignty. The Badrist influence within Iraq is perilously diffused, and any further dilution of that would crush your political clout - now be assured that in the event that you fail to stop receiving Iranian patrons and by extension funding, your deadliest political rival al-Sadr will have free rein over power. Who knows when he will start cracking down on the Badrists once the Sunnis have been cleansed? Just so we're clear, the 80% Solution isn't off the table.
To Sistani: It seems to us that you are clearly adamant about keeping the Shiite bloc intact, but preserving it simply does not promise any sort of resonance with your objectives (courtesy of a jacksonian) :Ali al-Sistani *wants* a Federal and non-sectarian government and has been stating so since the end of the major part of the conflict against the Ba'athists in 2003. His viewpoint, privately as related by numerous authors and reporters, is that he says the Sadrists will be *taken care of*. And, all indications of the emotional phrasing of that language is on the order of a Mafia Don talking about a smaller, rival gang. These folks who follow al-Sistani, hate, with avengence, the Khomeinist schools of thought and volunteered in huge numbers during the Iran/Iraq war. The reason we have not seen mass bloodshed of 'Lancet Proportions' is due wholly and completely to this grouping that supports a secular and common Federal Government. They do, however, sit on their hands and offer INTEL and anything else that does not make them an obvious target at home and sign up for the Army and Police in droves. The followers of al-Sistani are becoming the committed Nationalists of the New Iraq and prove that day in and day out by fighting and pacifying *anyone* in those organizations, even the upstart minority followers of al-Sistani that are militant.
Non-sectarianism is perilously close to becoming a myth: side with al-Sadr and you get your nationalistic wish, but in exchange for that, you seem all too willing to allow the Sunnis to be eradicated. I believe you are smart enough to realise that al-Sadr has absolutely no incentive or reason to distinguish between Baathists, aQ sympathisers and Sunni tribes aligned with us.
In the event of playing the Sadrists off against the Badrists, Iraq will eventually succumb to a devastating proxy war - the only way to prevent such an outcome is to coerce al-Sadr to disband the militias in exchange for a place in the coalition. al-Hakim would feel less threatened and thus be less inclined to turn towards his Iranian masters, and perhaps under the aegis of a true non-sectarian government would nationalism thrive without the threat to Iraqi sovereignty.
With that said, the focus now shifts on the tricky concept of counterinsurgency. Again, a jacksonian offers another refreshing alternative:"Tell you what, instead of regular combat troops, can you give me every single sniper team available across the US Armed Forces for about 3 months? We need to have the ROE changed so we can get rid of the insurgent contacts, too, so that their networks can be degraded and pulled up by regular units, both US and Iraqi. A bit better UAV coverage would help and some back-end coordination between units, but that should be pretty easy to do. Basically, I need the guys who can reach through walls and hurt someone and has the patience to do it right... lots of them working together. I guarantee low Civilian casualties."
Definitely more sustainable than the surge, and therefore more plausible an option should allen's expose of the hypothetical surge being a fallacious placation ring true:
[...] "This is a fight of removing effectiveness and cohesion. To do that we are already isolating the insurgents and putting them into pockets to ID and scope out via INTEL. The faster way to do that is to get a pair of eyes that will always be watching them across all of Baghdad and give them time to do the best job they can until 'go-day'. All the Snipers will have picked their spots, deconflicted their fire zones, arranged for good patrols, set up their replacement schedules and become the eyes and ears of the entire setup, and the long arm that will reach out once the scoping is basically done. I need their eyes and patience, first, so the INTEL ops folks can figure it all out and set up the priority list. Then, on the go-day, it will be killing time. They will not know what hit them."
After Afghanistan and Iraq and other places that cannot be mentioned, you, as a Theater Commander *know* what this tool of warfare is and what it means. Stalingrad became a no-go because of the rubble and people hiding everywhere. They were not hiding from the tanks.
They were hiding from the Snipers.
And in a clean and undamaged city, the Sniper is King.
[...] This would not end the insurgency, but it would make keeping them *out* of Baghdad a whole lot easier as the militants, their commanders, their suppliers... all of that goes. And anyone fool enough to not be in the recognized Iraqi or MNF Uniforms and carrying a weapon... will find a sudden end to their lives. A bitch to get going, probably take 3 weeks just for that alone... but once the observing is in place, and a few hits here and there to take out the few 'oddballs' and let people know they are being watched, that should do it. Stop daytime ops against personnel and let them think the night is safe, while we harvest INTEL. Exhausting for the Snipers, true. But it should a be a job they will enjoy after CNN...
"The only other thing is that whatever the Snipers need in the way of equipment, they GET. Nothing is spared from this, but I doubt they will need much. You want the violence of the TV screens gone, I can deliver, but only after something no one has ever witnessed before, anywhere."
[...] some good Sharpshooters to hang around once the Snipers leave so that good eyes can still be had to make sure the insurgents don't get back in too easily. My regular forces can keep the peace pretty well after that with the few hot-headed instant radicals that still will pop up."Oak Leaf at Polipundit threw out some interesting stats to think about as we contemplate the “surge” of troops to Iraq. At the moment, the ratio of support troops to line troops, i.e. helpers to shooters, is 1.3:1. Although this is less than the historic average of 1.6:1, it means that adding 30,000 shooters would demand a commitment of about 70,000 troops in the aggregate. The US does not have 70,000 fresh troops to add to the mix. Consequently, what will probably be the reality will be the addition of about 13,000 line troops. However, since at least two Marine regiments and an Army brigade will be held in Iraq beyond the usual tour of duty, the actual surge will be only a few thousand line troops, plus their support elements, deployed earlier than originally planned. In short, very little will change from the present deployment.
Has the surge been publicised for the sole purpose of appeasing those who would advocate Kagan's plan for declaring war on Iraq again, or does Bush have another plan concealed? Do we call his bluff?
There are lies, damned lies, and statistics.
Perhaps this "surge" will indicate a subtle but significant shift towards less policing and patrolling, more border security and logistical support in light of the marked increase in support personnel.
Or that I'm putting just a little too much faith in Bush.
William S. Lind paints a dire picture:Unfortunately, like most propaganda, it’s bunk. The U.S. Armed Forces are technically well-trained, lavishly resourced Second-Generation militaries. They are today being fought and beaten by Fourth-Generation opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan. They can also be defeated by Third-Generation opponents who can react faster than America’s process-ridden, PowerPoint-enslaved military headquarters. They can be defeated by superior strategy, by trick, by surprise, and by preemption. Unbeatable militaries are like unsinkable ships: they are unsinkable until something sinks them.
Salient post at the EB by Bob W. - agreed that Lind is seriously underestimating the prowress of our army, and the resilience of the national spirit in times of crisis such as this.
Lind assumes that Iran is able to mobilise its conventional national forces to encircle our troops, but to date, the mullahs have cautiously refrained from employing the national army for fear of a military coup d'etat - in truth, the loyalty of the armed forces is questionable at best, while the Foreign Legions of Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army, including the Revolutionary/Special Guards are much more dependable.
And I would think that our military is more than capable of operating in inclement weather than the incompetently trained Iranian army. Also, though our forces are dispersed, there should be little doubt as to whether we would be able to effectively mobilise and localise troops wherever necessary - somewhat akin to the novel idea of the General Staff under Helmut von Moltke in Germany prior to the First World War, whereby the stunning alacrity of German mobilisation utterly caught the European powers off-guard.
It is useful to refer to Lind's article An Operational Doctrine for Intervention.
I commented on part of Lind's argument when fellow peacekeeper provided the link at the EB a few weeks ago.
However, now it seems that the second part of the hypothesis requires dissecting.We live in a world in which the nationalism that arose in Europe in response to the French Revolution has spread almost universally. Any foreign presence rubs this nationalism the wrong way. The longer we stay, the more we assist our opponents in preaching the case for a national war.
Yet has Arab nationalism ever managed to successfully galvanise the peoples against foreign occupiers? Forget about Arab statesmen, despots and dictators - truth is, more often than not domestic and foreign policy has been guided by the interests of the Arab elites, not that of its peoples. Elite nationalism thrives, broad-based nationalism flounders.
Germany had Bismarck, Italy had Camillo di Cavour, France had Napoleon - these men had visions of nationalism, brotherhood and collective consciousness in the belief of shared values. What has the Arab world manage to conjure up? Perhaps they once believed in Arafat or Nasser, but the fact remains that factionalism and segmentalism remain endemic characteristics of Arab societies, and nationalism is a foreign import, a genie in a bottle that Arab elites would like contained as they exploit the divisiveness of tribes and sects for personal profit.
Even in Iraq, al-Sadr, al-Hakim and Sistani could very well have ordered us out in the name of protecting national sovereignty, yet till today, Sistani fears the Sadrists' influence radicalising moderate Shiites, while al-Sadr fears Iranian interference via al-Hakim's SCIRI, while al-Hakim has to fend off al-Sadr's nationalist credentials in order to earn more seats in parliament and establish a voting bloc to veto any Sadr-led measure that would threaten Iranian influence in Iraq.
Lind did remark that: We can eliminate hostile governments in some developing countries--seize their leaders, take control of their institutions, and turn the levers of power over to their opponents. We can destroy the regular armed forces in those countries, if our own forces can move fast enough to encircle them before they disperse. Once the armed forces are destroyed, we can stabilize the countryside for a certain period of time. In short, we can carry out what might be called an extended coup de main.
We do not necessarily need to worry too much about the Iranian national army, for it does not embody nationalistic spirit but instead is plagued by divided loyalties, or even vehemently opposed to the regime - that might explain why the mullahs are less than enthusiastic about deploying them to deal with unrest in Kurdish, Azeri and Baluch uprisings within Iran.
I'm not advocating the invasion of Iran, but what I would like to contribute to the discussion is that Iran's sting is in its predilection for proxy wars and nuclear capability, not direct confrontation. Iranian nationalism is fragile, predicated on the basis of pride in defending its right to nuclear arms; their national will is nowhere as strong and resilient as that of the American people in the event of a prolonged, necessary imperative to establish security and non-violence in the region.
H/T to Threatswatch - here's a particularly powerful passage that needs to be read:This war is strange. I never hear soldiers worried about their own morale sagging. Contrary, the war-fighters here are more concerned to bolster the morale of the people at home. Here in Kuwait, where the dining facilities are bedecked in Christmas decorations, soldiers stream in from Iraq on convoys and stream back north along those bomb-laden roads. The service members here are not all rear-echelon people who never see fighting or blood. Yet their overall morale obviously is high. Few of them know I am a writer, and so they speak freely at the tables around me. In Qatar, from which I just departed, I spoke with troops taking four-day R&R passes, some having just returned from the most dangerous parts of Iraq, and others heading straight back, and their overall morale was also very high. The morale at war is higher than I have ever seen it at home; makes me wonder what they know that most Americans seem to be missing. [emphasis added]
Have a little more faith.
5 spoke up:
Part of my point 10 the Theater Commander ticked off : Sistani, while scuttling the cross-ethnic agreement has *also* continued his tirade against all insurgents. The 'nasty suspicion' is that he is using the removal of the other armed factions to put the Iranian backed militias into stark contrast with his own beliefs. That may or may not be a winning concept, and waiting for that to come through is also a non-starter. Still, he will not sanction any militia, so that is all to the good. Probably wants Sadr out of the picture. With the work of the UK the breakup of the major insurgent groups into smaller 'bite sized' pieces should continue through the spring and early summer.
Sistani is, indeed, a Mafioso if I have looked at it correctly. He wants to be the 'sole legitimate leader' of Shia Islam in Iraq and Iran. He wants both cohesiveness of Shia government and removal of the hot-headed Sadr/Badr/assorted funded Iranian Shia organizations. By waiting it out and sitting on his hands, his hands do not get dirty, but the blood flows at his feet for doing nothing. An apt description of a mafia Don.
Also note that Iran has a huge problem in the very near future in its petro-industry. I have heard that China is looking to invest there, but the analysis holds because of the way that the regime views their own industry. The most *perfect* of democratic governments with tons of foreign support would make the entire industry 'touch and go' for survival if the regime was replaced *instantly* this very second with same. Chinese 'investment' may be seen by this regime as a good way to pull *more* Iranian money out of maintenance and put it into terrorism. The long term needs to be addressed and that requires removing subsidies, getting loads of competent people to come in and train folks to actually maintain the equipment and do some basic economic forecasting. The reason you do that is the lead-time for oil production and maintenance is measured in *years* not months or weeks. At the end of 3 years of rehabilitating the Iraq oil system it is now at or near full production capacity... that system is Soviet *junk* and needs a thorough replacement top to bottom over the next decade or so. If we think Iraq is an expensive proposition, then think of what happens when Iran starts to have to *import* gasoline... and its refineries go off-line. And it can no longer meet internal demand for natural gas.
The threat put forward by Iran is that they will 'just stop exporting oil'. Well, in 5-7 years or so it will have no other *option*.
Fund the terrorists *first* and heavily. That is the motto of Iran... and their oil industry is now proving that.
Harrison,
Great Post, and kudos to your well-constructed blog as well; I will definitely stop over here on a regular basis.
Bob W
bob w., thank you for stopping by! I just discovered your blog after 2164th responded to your post at the EB, and I'm making it part of my daily reads.
>a jacksonian
The British-led efforts to purge the Iraqi Police Force of corrupt, sectarian-minded personnel certainly is one of the brighter sparks amidst the "gloom-and-doom" whitewashing the MSM is culpable for.
Certainly, I agree that Sistani wants to assume the spiritual-clerical authority, but perhaps his optimism is misplaced? He seems to discount the possibility that by allowing the Sadrists and Badrists at each other, no holds barred, Shiites are going to be radicalised either direction their allegiance is swaying towards. His non-involvement and reluctance to speak out save for a few platitudes has been interpreted as intransigence, and that alone does not bode well for his authority - the perception is that he has been weakened in terms of political and spiritual authority, with al-Sadr sapping that and exploiting it to fuel nationalistic support for the Sadrists.
I seriously doubt that Sistani would emerge from this perilous situation unscathed, and in the event that one side manages to triumph over the other, his voice will count for nothing; Shiites will still respect him, but he is not the man to go to if they want things done. I wonder if he has considered what lies ahead for him. Or does he already realise that it is a necessary price to be paid - any price - in order to get us to withdraw in the shortest time possible?
I will have to get back to you about the Iranian energy crisis.
Here's what I found while perusing the EB today:
Iranian energy problems cropping up
Harrison - Like a Mafia Don al Sistani does have some strange views on things, and his hatred of the Iranians and the Sadr/Badr groups is known. He has not spoken out about the taking down of the #2 of the Sadr organization nor on any of the activity directed against Sadr/Badr/Iranian thugs. What he lacks is a military structure under his control and is counting on his influence on the majority of Shia's to be his key to the future.
As I had the Theater Commander speculate: that may or may not be a winner.
With Iranian funding for not only their own insurgents, but now to al Qaeda, the funding source of that must be taken into account and its intermediary: Syria. al Qaeda from KSA dares not take that money in any way through KSA and so is limited there, but in Syria they have a resource for supply of equipment and areas to train. The blowing up of a truck-bomb at the Syria border coming *from* Syria points to this and this 'second front' against Iraq needs to be closed with finality.
Withdrawal of MNF troops without a sustainable Iraqi Army leaves the Nation in chaos. The Government ran a surplus last year and is ploughing money into its oil infrastructure and into 18 more Battalions, most likely of the Sunni tribes that sided with the Government. The Brits wanted a police force up quickly and are now paying for that with heavy infiltration and having to commit forces to cleaning the infiltrators out. The US is using a 'slow growth' approach and bringing up capability and confidence across the board, but that is a time consuming process which the limited attention span of the American people are having problems with.
In any event, clearing Baghdad of insurgents lets forward momentum get back into the picture in the south. Work there and in Anbar and the slow Iraqi cleaning of Ramadi will yield much there and leave anyone coming into Iraq from Syria without a good base to get to. The best route is to just let the Iraqis get experienced enough to finally clean up Ramadi themselves, relieve pressure in Anbar and funnel the experience gained from those units in Ramadi into new units heading south into Baghdad and west into Anbar. That gets you into mid- to late-summer 2007.
Sistani may have events removed from his hands if the current ruling coalition dissolves or fractures. If the Sadrists fell as an organization, that secures the rest of their coalition as those MPs are removed from play. That said the first stirrings of a cross-coalition is shaping up, but slowly. Sunni Arab, Kurd and Urban Shias are starting to see commonality in their needs and viewpoints, and less with the overtly religious parties. A fracturing of the current coalition then allows a small set of Shia parties to switch to the other coalition and bring *it* to power. Sistani wants a Shia led Iraq and this would hurt him, but he his faced with Sadr/Badr and some few others that will not help him and they are his enemies directly, no second-removed there. For Sistani, sitting on the sidelines and not agreeing is a very, very dicey move. He is hoping for a lot of things to happen that are on the iffy side and not likely to coalesce.
That flip side is the Sunni Arab one. If they can keep a compact and non-power hungry coalition then they have a brand-new role in Iraq: Kingmaker. They will not get to *lead* Governments, but they will decide who WILL lead Governments. Once they cotton on to that, then insurgents become a direct threat to that role and things start to break up on the insurgent side. After being so long as annointed rulers they don't want to be 'the power behind the throne'. And yet that has its own rewards as everyone comes looking to *you* with gifts and kind words to sway you to their side.
That is a decade or so in the doing. We may not have that long to wait and I don't want to see Syria announce the full monty of chem/bio/nuclear weapons plus SCUD-Ds in the next couple of years. The Middle East may not survive *that* no matter what happens to Iran. There is time yet to deal with things, but the need for a National Foreign Policy on the Middle East and what the US is looking for in the *form* of stability needs to be done. Without that, we will be putting everything at risk.
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