Doves and Vultures
"We will head to Baghdad soon. We have 3,000 soldiers who are currently undergoing intensive training especially in urban combat and how the army should act inside city," said Brig. Gen. Nazir Assem Korran, commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division of the Iraqi army that is based in the city of Irbil.
Eating at the same table - how could it be possible?
It is do-or-die, make-or-break - pick a euphemism - time for America, specifically speaking, Bush. Public opinion is slowly dissipating as the Democratic Congress gets its act together slowly but surely - already, there are signs that Republicans such as Sam Brownback might join hands with their Democrat counterparts to evoke a two-thirds veto, or filibuster if you will (the "nuclear option") in order to ensure that we lose in Iraq.
Yes, it is not a myth, nor is it a baseless accusation when I speak - with a modicum of controlled scorn as is required when attempting a meaningful discourse without being unnecessarily adversarial - of the traitorous, or at best clueless, intentions of the Democrats. For all the criticism of Bush regarding his frustrating inability to clearly elucidate what our mission is in Iraq, amid the firestorm and demagogic verbiage everyone seems to have forgotten that the Democrats still have been consistently unable to state their stand, or display the resolve to stick to their position without succumbing to the tendencies of a tumbleweed in the desert. That impotency has riddled the Democrats up till today: they have been trying so, so hard to bring the president down so that nobody will ask them what they think.
desert rat recently spoke of these dissenters:Disloyal, burka wearing Republicans.
I'm not so sure of Bush's intellect capable of outshining his critics, who are emerging from the woodwork and multiplying by the tens and hundreds. Despite whatever achievements he may have accomplished at the end of his term (and it seems increasingly doubtful, impossible even, to contain the fallout - nuclear or otherwise - of the disintegration/implosion of the Iranian regime within the limited timeframe), he will be viewed with immense scepticism with regards to how he scraped through an incoherent foreign policy and failed to garner public opinion in his favour.
That's all there is to say about those fellows, like Mr King.
If only they'd realize that, in 30 or 40 years, the brillance of Mr Bush's intellect will outshine all those that have come to doubt his policies.
Certainly, the Decider has decided to stake everything on this latest venture of a "surge", putting the onus on Maliki once and for all; clandestinely preparing for an assault on Iran, leaving nothing to chance. History will judge him accordingly - nevertheless, he is the lone ranger amidst back-stabbing, self-serving bandits.
Who is in such a position of power to confer upon him the necessary resolve? Not the Republicans, certainly not the Democrats. He will have to face this baptism of fire all by himself, and may he find the strength to do what is needed of him - what the Democrats and Republicans all know must be done but are afraid to risk their careers, salaries and reputations; what the short-sighted public cannot see past the MSM whitewash; what our enemies fear will expose the fragility and weaknesses of their pseudo-ideological infrastructure.
Back to the "surge" - marc schulman's sentiments echo mine:The best indicator of the Iraqi government's choice will be whether or not its army takes decisive and sustained action against al-Sadr's militia. Since al-Sadr is a participant in the government, this course of action will almost certainly split the government. It's highly unlikely that al-Sadr will order his militia to lay down its arms and, even if he were to do so, recent reports indicate that not everyone in the militia he formed is still loyal to him. Accordingly, if Maliki is true to his word and has the power to control the army, the most likely outcome will be an intra-Shi'a conflict resembling, perhaps, the conflict between the PLO and Hamas. No wonder Bush, in his speech, warned that much violence lies ahead.
Not exactly coincidental, this is also the crucial point in time for Maliki to prove his worth. Both men need each other at this fragile juncture: for Bush - not simply a superficial manner in which to vindicate his actions thus far, but the success he needs to demonstrate the importance of securing long-term security in the Middle East (as opposed to short-term satisfaction of withdrawal); for Maliki - to finally rid himself of the intimidating coercion of al-Sadr, to grasp the nationalistic symbolism for the Iraqi government, and to prevent both an Iranian takeover and the possibility of Iraq degenerating into a proxy battleground between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which could last for decades given their financial resources. I admit I could be wrong about Maliki's intentions, but it would be prudent to note that the man has now presented to him the necessary firepower and unprecedented political freedom (freed from constraints such as Sistani's refusal to break up the Shiite bloc) to forge a new epoch amid the sectarian ruins.
Maliki wants the limelight, and this is his golden opportunity to deny al-Sadr the glory.
The current plan calls for a defensive manoeuvre - securing mixed Shia-Sunni neighbourhoods, clear-and-hold protocol; al-Sadr is obviously waiting for the impetus of the surge to fade, since he has the luxury of time. Without the substantial increase in troops (which doesn't seem to be guaranteed despite Bush's quiet endorsement of Kagan's plan), a defensive operation may only result in success that will last as long as al-Sadr desires to remain dormant.
I had my doubts about a defensive strategy, basically because it would mean hunkering down (once, the phrase “hunker down” cynically meant allowing the crossfire between Shiites and Sunnis continue above our heads), and without Bush choosing to elucidate what we were here for, and where this was all going, the insurgents and militias could very well wait us out till our enthusiasm and psychological strength had been sapped. But with the new plan of clear-and-hold, there seems to be a real sense of optimism: arresting the role of provider of security, the guarantor of internal sovereignty, the Iraqi troops will gradually convince the local tribes (four more tribes in Ramadi have switched to our side) and locals that the Iraqi government is the nationalistic face, not al-Sadr, al-Hakim or anyone complicit with the mullahs.
I foresee that some will object to my assertion that the Iraqi Army will remain intact despite the dissolution of the Maliki government (note that this is the likely, regrettable scenario we must accept should Maliki betray us yet again - a plan that does not consider the possibility of failure is doomed from the start).
Bill Roggio's and Bill Ardolino's in-depth coverage of the collaborative efforts between US and Iraqi soldiers have convinced me that there is more than just false hope that a national army of the Iraqis is now believing in the necessity of protecting its citizens, Shiite or Sunni. Insurgent attacks, death squad reprisals and the like are only going to strengthen the resolve of these troops, and our "surge" will convince the Iraqi commanders and soldiers on the ground that we too, are committed to helping them ride out the storm. Note that I emphasise on convincing the Army and not "the government". If Maliki truly is deadset on backing al-Sadr right to the hilt, then no amount of forces or surges will change the current situation in Iraq.
The majority of soldiers in the Iraqi Army is going to be Shiite, so Shiites in Iraq may not interpret al-Sadr's fall as tantamount to the dissipation of Shiite power, thus the Shiites themselves might be encouraged by that to stake their support for the Army. This is taking into consideration the opinion of most Sunnis: they do not want reconciliation with the Shiites. nykrindc timely provides this:The Sunni insurgents (as noted by the President) are suggesting that they will not only cut ties to al Qaeda, but also cease attacks on US forces so long as they either 1) rein in the Shiite militias, death squads, etc. 2) don't fight along the Shiite government's forces 3) don't seek to arrest Sunni insurgent commanders.
And here he offers his take on the problematic issue of composition of soldiers:The Army is seen as just another part of the Shiite oppressive apparatus and as such an enemy to the Sunnis. [...] how to ensure that the majority of Army units were not affiliated or loyal to the various Shiite militias such as the Badr Organization or Sadr's Mahdi army. This apparently may not be enough, since the Sunnis see the army as being just another tool of the Iranian backed Shiites to dominate them. This means, that they will continue attacking it, and any American or coalition forces that are embedded with it.
The Sunni insurgents have acknowledged that the greater enemy is the Shia, and that if we associate ourselves with them (it's going to be extremely difficult to convince the Sunnis that the Army and Police are nonsectarian - though the head of al-Sadr would definitely be a step in that direction), the Sunnis are perfectly satisfied of driving themselves six feet under - that is, frustrating us to the point that we will decide to quit Iraq, and they will choose to instead attempt to sustain the ethnic cleansing by the Shiites (either they are truly confident of their ability to wipe out the Shiites or that they would rather go down in a blaze of glory). Either way, if we try to make the two sides shake hands, the insurgents will continue to sabotage and instigate the Shiite militias.
It's as perverse as it gets, but this is brinkmanship to get what they want. And it may just work. Think about it: pretty soon, the neighbourhoods in Iraq would most likely have been secured, most Shiite militias would be disbanded. If Sunni insurgents create any trouble in the future, it will be easier to take them out, especially when the Iraqi Army ingratiates itself with the Iraqi citizens and convinces them that the insurgency is now unnecessary to enforce security. Already, the clear-and-hold strategy is beginning to take shape: the Sadrists are gathering towards a localised position.
For now, we need the cooperation of the insurgents not to wreak further havoc, and not to further antagonise Maliki to change his mind about working with us - what with the Iraqi government starting to warm up to us:Al-Inizi said "Iraq is not an American state and Bush must consult with us before making such decisions about sending troops…" to which al-Alusi responded by saying "We have an elected prime minister and he was consulted…you and others like yourself wouldn't be sitting here had America not helped us. They are trying to protect this democracy and they possess what they can offer to help us with the security situation, but what do you have?? Cut the nonsense, ok? Do you think the parliament wants to vote about this? Fine, let's ask everybody if they want such voting…"
Update: a jacksonian has his own pseudo-fictionalised version of the proceedings.
There was only silence in the hall after this and no one said another word about voting.
Is there a burgeoning promise of nationalism bubbling beneath the surface?
The Kurds have been willing to send their troops instead of retreating into splendid isolationism:An Iraqi army brigade based in the northern Kurdish region is undergoing intensive training in urban combat and will be dispatched to Baghdad soon as part of a new joint U.S.-Iraqi security drive in the sprawling and violence-ridden city, the commander said on Saturday.
Observers have long advocated reining in the Kurds to aid us in our security efforts in Iraq, and this represents a first phase in what should be a concerted objective to deter Iranian interference in the region. I have previously discussed about the corollary of Kurdish backlash over excessive Iranian interventionism in Iraq, and the geostrategic position of the Kurds would only be magnified if Kurdistan ever came into being. This spirit of cooperation might stem from more practical concerns: the Kirkuk question will remain unresolved as long as sectarian conflict continues in Iraq.
It is obviously more convincing if it were a Kurdish-led force securing the neighbourhoods of Shiites and Sunnis than if it were mostly composed of Shiites alone - this also nicely ties in with the preconditions of the insurgents that they want nothing to do with Shiites. Which leads me to suggest: how viable would it be if Shiite-dominated neighbourhoods were policed by the Iraqi Army, while Sunni neighbourhoods secured by a more evenly-balanced Kurdish-Shiite-Sunni division of the Army? The peshmerga would remain where it is: protecting its own Kurdish provinces.
In light of this new collaboration, the question of security might very well be resolved to a significant degree - it also fulfills the preconditions for a nonsectarian Army, keeps the more belligerent Sunnis safely away from the Shiites, maximises the capabilities of the Army and Police to identify troublemakers within each neighbourhood and take decisive action in the contained environment - and now perhaps therein lies the possibility of nationalism.
There are dichotomies between aQ, Sunni insurgents (Baathist or otherwise) and moderate Sunnis. As I have already addressed the position of Sunni insurgents above, let us take a look at aQ and its backers: the Saudis.
The Saudis are funding aQ because it knows that only through that can it ward off Iranian hegemony - the situation in Iraq represents a proxy war between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia (I do also note that it is a proxy war on many other fronts, but that is another matter to discuss) - so aQ is more of an invaluable asset than a destabilising threat anytime.
In fact, if aQ in Iraq were to be totally eradicated, and the Sunni insurgents turn to the tribes in Anbar for guidance regarding the flushing out of aQ operatives - now that would be the worst nightmare perpetuated for the Saudis, because not only are they ill-prepared for a conventional war with Iran should Iraq become an Iranian puppet state (like Syria is), their co-religionists in Iraq would be unwilling to foment instability to counter creeping Iranian hegemony in the region - therefore, no buffer zone between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
I believe that it is in the vital interests of the Saudis to keep this proxy war going, since it would eventually radicalise all moderate Sunnis to turn to Wahhabism - and by extension aQ - should the ethnic cleansing by Shiite militias continue; it is the Saudis' intention to perpetuate an unstable Iraq at the very least (the optimal outcome being an Iraq hostile to Iran), and they have accepted this less-than-perfect eventuality perhaps because they realise that they do not have the capability of totally rebuffing Iranian interference in Iraq.
As nykrindc also correctly pointed out, aQ as a state-within-a-state in Iraq would present a whole new Afghanistan, and therefore easier to counter without permission from the Iraqi government if aQ infiltration has already metastasised to that degree.
It leads me to conclude that the Saudis are looking for a scenario that at the very least fulfils the following objectives:
1) the continuing existence of aQ as a countervailing force against Shiite hegemony within Iraq
2) the status of Iraq being a proxy battleground on which Iran can never be allowed to establish an overwhelming influence on
3) to assist in forging an Iraq that will not be particularly sensitive to aQ involvement (though it looks like a losing battle for them now) - that entails countering the appeal of tribes of Anbar that have aligned themselves with the Iraqi government
nykrindc also commented that the Saudis are beginning to sense the shift in power dynamics, especially the vulnerability of aQ, and thus are diverting part of their funding to these Sunni insurgents instead. Either way, it serves their interests of creating a viable buffer against Iranian hegemony. However, if the Sunni insurgents actually take up our offer as aforementioned and actually begin assisting the Anbar tribes in ridding Iraq of aQ - and any rebel groups refusing to conform - then the Saudis will start panicking.
We can reassure them that the Iranian threat will be contained by the measures taken above: incorporation of a nonsectarian army, flushing out of Iranian agents and sympathisers. The Sunni insurgents and tribes will be monitored, and any funding the Saudis direct to them will be easily tracked in a contained environment.
Divorced from foreign funding and instigation, constant ingratiation with the Iraqi Army, satisfied with security in the neighbourhood - perhaps these conditions will be ripe for Sunnis to conceptualise this as a national, rather than sectarian, struggle. Constant Saudi interventionism should be publicised and castigated as vociferously as its Iranian counterpart, and these forces will drive Sunnis to turn to the Iraqi government - who will by then have the monopoly on internal and external sovereignty and force - for protection. This will not be easy, and what I have proposed is not the panacea, but it is worth a try.
As for the Shiites, winds of similar nature are driving them together: Maliki is finally pledging to eradicate those among them who would cause trouble and satisfy their sectarian hatred at the expense of security for all; al-Hakim is forced to choose between Iran and the Iraqi government - and he knows that if evidence is found in future raids that implicate him, Maliki might have the jurisdiction to sentence him to a fate similar to Saddam's. Yet I sense that al-Hakim might actually be more willing to cooperate than previously thought - perhaps he too realises that Iran's position might not be so secure after all.
al-Sadr's acceptance of funding from Iran should be publicised - association with the Persian enemy is a serious crime in most Iraqis' eyes, and the nationalistic appeal of the cleric will rapidly dissipate, thereby denying him the public support that has been his safety net. For months, he has been threatening to pull out of the government. In time, that will not matter, for his clout would have been marginalised, if not entirely negated. The monopoly of nationalistic sentiment will then be more successfully wielded by Maliki, Sistani and the Iraqi government - and that bodes much better for the Iraqis as a people, as a nation.
There's an intriguing point that nykrindc makes in his latest post:The argument that was made, and I think it may have been based on the President's own talking points, is that victory in Iraq is essential to winning the war on terror.[...] the same was said of Vietnam during the Cold War. Mainly, the argument was based on the Domino Theory which stated that a loss in Vietnam would lead to the the rise of communism in all of Southeast Asia and would be a devastating loss to the United States in its conflict against the Soviet Union. What I want to point out, is that while the argument was partially true (most of Southeast Asia did fall to communism) it was also wrong. Why? Because although the United States lost the Vietnam war, we won the most important war of all, the Cold War against the Soviet Union.
The difference, I would like to interject, is that if we somehow "lose" Iraq, it would be interpreted by the Sunnis not as a triumph of Arab/Islamofascism over civilisation/West, but rather more painfully, as a harbinger of Persian hegemony, as an insult to Arab pride. Similarly, if we "won" Iraq, it would be regarded as a victory over Iran by Sunnis, not that of us over Arabs/Islamofascism. How could Arabs ever allow us to claim victory on our terms? One can always count on them to paint their own triumphs - even the 1973 War of Attrition was depicted as a victory for the Arabs over Israel.
Thus, in either case should the dice roll, the wider implications will be felt much more viscerally in the Middle East between the Arab nations than directly at home: as Edward Luttwak has saliently opined:The Iraq war has indeed brought into existence a New Middle East, in which Arab Sunnis can no longer gleefully disregard American interests because they need help against the looming threat of Shiite supremacy, while in Iraq at the core of the Arab world, the Shia are allied with the U.S. What past imperial statesmen strove to achieve with much cunning and cynicism, the Bush administration has brought about accidentally. But the result is exactly the same.
The seeds of Iraqi nationalism have been sown, and the geopolitical conditions - the steady temperature maintained by the equilibrium of countervailing forces in the balance of power between Shiites, Sunnis and Persians - are promising, to say the least.
The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. I would like to believe that we are not as foolish as that.
5 spoke up:
The difference between Vietnam and Iraq is that the multiple faultlines of the Middle East running through Iraq do not stop anyplace nearby. If folks in the US cannot learn how to do analysis of post-war historical records and then analysis of demographics, then they miss some obvious and huge problems. Imagine the M.E. as the Balkans... save with $100 billions in reserve, rampant radical sects, tribes galore and all of that waiting to unravel once civil society begins to break down. Iran cannot actually stop that once it starts as those faultlines will *also* break them apart... you do not get a nice little Iranian Empire anytime soon, although al Qaeda might be able to set up shop and get one running. Instead you get something like The Balkans save just as intensely divided and continuously from Sinai to India, the Empty Quarter to Russia. Even Turkey might disintegrate with multiple ethnicities going as various religious sects try to grab power and the military is riven between them.
The Dominoes from Vietnam were stopped by the sea. In Iraq there is no easy stopping point anywhere nearby. That is what we ask for if we let go now. And the death toll from that will not stop at the tens of millions.
The majority of soldiers in the Iraqi Army is going to be Shiite, so Shiites in Iraq may not interpret al-Sadr's fall as tantamount to the dissipation of Shiite power, thus the Shiites themselves might be encouraged by that to stake their support for the Army. This is taking into consideration the opinion of most Sunnis: they do not want reconciliation with the Shiites.
Sorry, it took me a while to post a comment. I wanted to point out that although this may happen it is unlikely as even within the Shiites there are divisions among those who are more Iraqi nationalists, and Iranian backed groups. The tension is seen within the government between the Badr organization headed by Hakim, and the Sadr militia headed by al Sadr. Despite the fact that Hakim seems to talking to us, he is ultimately beholden to Iran as that is where he spent the majority of his time in exile as did most of the members of his group. Al Sadr, on the other hand, despite receiving aid from Iran, is less beholden to Iran as he spent most of his time in Iraq under Hussein. He has repeatedly sought to enhance his nationalist credentials by seeking a measure of solidarity with some Sunnis, and by sending his Mahdi army to fight against the Peshmerga in Kirkuk to prevent them from annexing it into Kurdistan. This, while Hakim and SCIRI (the political arm) have called for and actively sought to divide Iraq into a Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni enclaves. In essence, in going after Sadr, we may be doing our own long term goal of preventing the rise of Iranian influence in Iraq much more harm than good. Al Sadr takes Iranian aid because at this point he must (to fight the Sunni insurgents and to get better training against American forces). However, in the long run, it is likely that Sadr will stakeout his own position and seek to limit Iranian interference. The reason, he is after all an Arab Shiite, not a Persian one. That division has existed for a long time, and has been the cause of many rivalries and confrontations between Shiite Arabs and Persians both in religious terms (think Qum in Iran and Najaf in Iraq), economic, political etc. As I argues at American Future recently, we need to think long-term and ensure that our short-term gain does not become our long-term loss.
Jacksonian,
I think you are over-selling your argument. The first thing I would point out, in the “if we loose Iraq” scenario, is that unlike Vietnam where we withdrew completely, here we will not. No one, except for the fringe on the left has called for an absolute withdrawal. Most people, including the Democratic Party have called for a strategic redeployment mean to contain the chaos in Iraq (stop it from spreading to neighboring countries). As I outlined in my argument, the al Qaeda theory is more of a red herring than anything else. Al Qaeda does not have the support in Iraq, and given the current situation hardly any allies in Iraq to carry out its objective. The Sunnis are seeking a means of rapprochement with the US, while fighting the Shia, and they will burn al Qaeda’s behind if that is what it takes. The fault lines in the Middle East are indeed varied; however, it is a misreading of the situation to say that if Iraq goes so does the rest of the region. That is far from certain. The most likely scenario is that the Shiite, Sunni rivalry will be resolved in Iraq, in much the same way that Eritrea and Ethiopia are fighting each other in Somalia. You state that the dominoes in Vietnam were stopped by the sea, but that in Iraq there is no easy stopping point, I disagree. If we eventually decide to withdraw from the population centers of Iraq, we can move to the borders, or to neighboring states, or just over the horizon and still be able to manage the chaos. Lebanon did not rip the Middle East to shreds, Iraq won’t either. I would agree with you that if we withdrew completely and left the region to its own devices, what you argue would have a better chance of happening, but with us in the region, involved and committed to contain the chaos, the possibility is much reduced.
NYkrinDC - Great moniker! Somehow BflonianVA just doesn't do it for myself....
Remember the timeline that Congress finally hit on in Vietnam?
"Well, we won't fund any more troops."
"Well, we won't fund any more support for the government because the equipment might fall if the government does."
"Well, we can't really stay in Vietnam."
"Well, we can't authorize flyovers and airsupport..."
"See, toldya it was lost!"
Define 'periphery': Is this the 'Murtha Periphery' of Okinawa?
Is it sitting just outside the major cities in Iraq?
Can't really stay in KSA as that is an al Qaeda talking point.
Kuwait?
The Kurdish Provinces only?
Jordan?
Turkey has been none too helpful and actually working and cross-purposes... so thats a big 'no'.
Any withdrawal until the Iraqis finally throw in the towel is a losing proposition and a morale killer for the Armed Forces. Now, if you are talking a retreat to the border of Iran and securing Basra and some folks sitting out by Tal Afar by the Syrian border and some across the Turkey, KSA and Jordanian border and making them a 'sure inspection upon pain of death zone'... well, now you might be talking of a 'periphery'. Until an alternate plan put forward by the military or the President is given, I really don't want to hear what Congress has to say. They spoke up enough in 1970-74 and pointed out that the wisdom of George Washington was vital: Presidents run wars.
Please do take a look at Lebanon and the involvement of Syria after it got going, then Iran, and the repression along the border region of Syria with Lebanon and a little place known as Hama that was used as a demonstration by Syria that their decrepit military was good enough to still kill civilians...
Plus we have not seen anything of the Regular Iranian Army: not training, not a real profile, they have not been through a major re-equipment cycle since the I/I war. They stay in their bases save for some 'shows of force'. From what is heard the regiime does not trust their regular army or police... which is why you see the Revolutionar/Special Guards and Basij thugs the most often. And some 'hired guns' from Chechnya and other regions.
Look at Iraq vice the 1920 Rebellion and other rebellions. Sectarianism does play a part, but local tribal outlook over-rules that. And as tribes cross sectarian bounds, only those that are heavily committed to one sect tend to join sectarian struggles. That is why, in Anbar, 25 tribes joined with the government and 6 on the border of Syria kept to al Qaeda. Notice the number strongly aligned to Ba'athists: 0. Unless the outlook from Fallujah is correct by that police officer, then there is a distinct 1:1 alignment of ex-Ba'athists to al Qaeda if they like to kill people. The West in general, and large sections of the US that do not have strong familial ties, forget this as a motivating factor: tribes, clans and personal glory are all drivers when the breakdown of society happens in those regions where tribalism is played up as a distinguishing factor. That is the Middle East. Iran is not monobloc Persian and have similar problems with the Kurds, Azeris and cross-border clans and tribes that do *not* like the regime. The regime continues to crack down on any show of separatism in the Kurdish and Azeri populations. Similar though lesser problems are seen along the Eastern border regions. Iran, itself, *still* has a sizeable royalist faction inside the Persian population... and the demographics problem of the overall population is also a destabilizing factor.
Turkey is facing Kurds that have their own ideas, plus groups separately financed by Iran and Syria. Further, radical islamists are being funded by Iran in the form of the Islamic Virtue Party inside Turkey. And now the joint operation Hezbollah is starting to migrate into Turkey. The actual change in demographics and religious affiliation inside Turkey, now makes the actual, secular military questionable on its secular outlook.
Syria has strong internal police and repressive organizations across Syria, and especially in the Kurdish regions where they do not want problems *inside* Syria and crack down hard in the North Eastern regions. Also of worry is the Druze Christian/Muslim population which coheres as Druze across the Lebanese border. Jordan has a relatively compact fighting force and a huge number of unincorporated Palestians that are in their third or fourth generation as 'refugees'. Or squatters depending on what time of day you catch certain parts of the regime there. After Egypt, Jordan is perhaps the most stable of the Arab states... but its periphery and tribes also present a problem with terrorists. Zarqawi came from Jordan as have some number of other PLO, al Qaeda, and Islamic Jihad terrorists. Also, Syria has been the Iranian middle-man and has gotten technology from both sides of the transactional equation, especially their lovely uranium separation plant that the got from Sweden. Add in some Mitutoyo separators from the AQ Khan network via Iran and you have a Nation that will have the full monty of WMDs. Plus long range ballistic missiles. Further Syria is a Ba'athist funding point for insurgents and terrorists in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. Mind you it is a minority Alawite Muslim family holding power there.
KSA has internal factional disputes amongst its royalty and that is causing a problem with actually coordinating defenses of the Kingdom. The presence of both al Qaeda *and* Hezbollah operating in KSA points to factional problems inside the royal family and funding sources amenable to *both* within the country.
I do not see this as 'playing up problems' but as taking a look at how traditional tribal associations operate during times of stress and social problems. I have problems finding real Nations that have actual, internal identification and Nationalism within the region. That has been by design of all the governments there which play up factionalism to keep everyone after each other and the ruling faction in power. Norvell de Atkine's work is elucidating on the topic and pointing to the problems based on society and what they mean for internal and external outlook. Getting social cohesion for Nationalism does take time and none of the regimes in the region have spent time trying to do that, and have done just the opposite for long decades. The exceptions to this are the Kurds and Israel.
I have read that everyone knew that WWI was going to happen at the time, but no one knew where. It stared with a minor faction wanting to be affiliate with another faction and using a political assassination to try and get that. The Austro-Hungarian Empire kept a 'lid' on The Balkans for a long time, but the demographics never did get through on representational basis and when the lid came off it spilled over and quickly.
The Stasis of the Cold War is finally leaving the Middle East and now the ethnic, demographic, social and other changes are starting to shift things there. al Qaeda has a plan for this, that just might work in the short- to medium- term which plays upon all these factors. A long-term outlook is wonderful... if you survive to get to it. We have no plan to 'manage chaos'. The Enemy *does*, and plans for it.
Thank you both for raising salient points.
nykrindc, about two months back, I posited the notion that al-Sadr represented the main nationalistic figure of Iraq, that he was the most likely candidate around which Iraqis - or at least the Shiites - would rally in order to rebuff Iranian interventionism and their intentions to extend hegemonic rule over Iraq. However, though I do agree to some extent that al-Sadr is much less beholden to Iran than al-Hakim and SCIRI, this degree of complicity and cooperation between the Mahdi Army and its Iranian financers promises only to increase substantially as al-Sadr prepares to hunker down and wait out the surge. The militias under the Sadrists are going to find that it will become progressively harder, costlier and ultimately unsustainable to wrest control of neighbourhoods policed by the Iraqi Army, backed by Kurdish brigades; al-Sadr will continue to demand ever-increasing amounts of funding from Iran, thereby ensuring that his dependence on Iran increases in the long-term.
He has repeatedly sought to enhance his nationalist credentials by seeking a measure of solidarity with some Sunnis, and by sending his Mahdi army to fight against the Peshmerga in Kirkuk to prevent them from annexing it into Kurdistan.
As aforementioned, the only alternative to active Kurdish cooperation is secession. al-Sadr's intentions to ward off the peshmerga can be rationalised as such: he knows that the Kurdish peshmerga are just as, if not more, deadly efficient and ruthless as his own militias, and that if the Kurds proceed to intervene militarily, the Shiite militias will gain no sanctuary. Sunnis have a natural aversion to the Kurds, but they hate the Sadrists much, much more. Also, al-Sadr's threats of carrying out death squad operations against Kurdish targets ring hollow in the face of increased cooperation between the US, Kurds and Maliki's government. Neither can al-Sadr count on Iran and Turkey to stoke the fires of secessionism by interfering with the affairs of the Kurds.
The Kurds are not going anywhere without Kirkuk, and al-Sadr knows it.
A significant majority of Shiites are deeply distrustful of Iranian intentions - anti-Persianism being a common feature among Arab nations (or at least their elites would have us believe) - and al-Sadr once represented the nationalistic messiah that they needed to stand up against the mullahs. Yet now, the Iraqi government is showing that it, too, has the resources and decisive will to crack down on the militias and provide security - only without being reliant on Iranian financers that would almost certainly demand debt to be paid back: a veto-happy voting bloc of Iranian sympathisers in parliament, border "security" being left in the hands of Iran.
Most Shiites have not been fully radicalised as to unconditionally support al-Sadr, and they have come to realise that even though they are the majority in Iraq, peace and security will never be allowed to flourish as long as al-Sadr is allowed to defy the government - he will never seek a peaceful resolution with the Sunnis, neither will he acquiesce with the Iraqi Army competing with the Mahdi Army for monopoly over internal security. al-Sadr's serious miscalculation in going after the Kurds will factor in the considerations of most Shiites: instigating the Kurds to further destabilise Iraq is an even worse prospect than ethnic cleansing of Sunnis. They might very well choose to rid Iraq of al-Sadr to prevent Shiite neighbourhoods from being the target of Kurdish wrath.
If al-Sadr had the tacit support of the majority of Shiites, he would have been done with the ethnic cleansing by now. It underscores two aspects: one, the militias' capabilities in executing that threat have been seriously compromised by both political and military obstacles; two, if getting rid of the Sunnis is so tough, one cannot envision how long it would take - or if it were even possible - to actually defend Iraq from Kurds and Sunnis.
As for the regional context, if we "lose" Iraq, it would metastasize into a proxy battleground between Iran and KSA, thus ensuring with grim certainty the absolute anarchy and devastation that will turn Iraq into the killing fields of the Middle East. If Iran somehow manages to wrest control of Iraq, it will be turned into either a patron puppet state like Syria, or that of a buffer state like Lebanon: the repercussions will spread, and virulently so.
Losing Iraq would also deprive us of a pressure point against the other belligerent regime of Syria - encirclement of Assad's regime would require that Iraqi, Jordanian and Turkish borders are equally tight and effective. It is undoubtedly an extremely difficult objective to accomplish - Jordan is probably the only ally we can count on right now to police their borders, for they have a very valid concern with regards to insurgents, Shiite or Sunni alike. Remember, they took care of Black September.
Turkish cooperation would be a bonus, but if Kurdistan were to be forged and realised, a significant portion of the Turkish border would be controlled by the Kurds themselves - the Turks would be even more hard-pressed to secure their borders.
Even more ominously, without Iraq acting as a state hostile to Iranian interests, the transfer of arms and personnel from Iran to Syria will be allowed to burgeon and prosper - and that directly affects Lebanon, Palestine and Israel as the Foreign Legions of Iran such as Hezbollah will be able to create their own states-within-states and wield power without accountability.
Just as Germany was deemed to be too important to be left weakened and ravaged by the vicissitudes of vengeful powers post-1918 and then post-1945, the same can also be said of Iraq: its geographical location speaks for its own importance.
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