The Possum Bistro

Champagne Supernova!

Christmas has just passed - with great fanfare, indeed - and this year's pseudo-celebrations (since I'm not Christian and thus view it in a rather detached, secularistic manner) involved a fair bit of shopping, fine dining and wine, a trip to the cinema and a rare trickle of heartfelt presents. This Christmas was definitely much more memorable than last year's, and I'm grateful for that!

First order of the day: let me thank the special people who have made this year so wonderful and memorable for me (this might be a little lengthy (wait, isn't that an oxymoronic phrase) :

To Patrick - thanks for being there and giving me moral support for my endeavours; your sanity and maturity is much appreciated, and you've been nothing but encouraging!

To Mingwei - you've been a great help in dishing out advice, and your company is treasured; your capacity for lameness occasionally stuns me sometimes, but I'll be the first to admit you're not alone in your guilt! Your humour and charisma shine through, and I hope you find your calling in MDIS.

To Brose - thanks for being the only person I know who's persistently unafraid to go against the mainstream (though whether that's ingenious or disastrous, it's debatable), and for being a trustworthy confidant. Thanks also for dragging me to the gym - one day, we'll get the free weights (without smashing the glass panels).

To Huiyin - thanks for being the realistic, rational person that you are, with a little cynicism mixed in for good measure, because in this warped world that we live in, being too innocent will entice others to take advantage of your naivete. Your recommendations for books, movies and art have been top-notch, and I'm still learning "how to be a gentleman", so your purchase is not in vain! Phantom, here we come (in three months time - patience is a virtue)!

To Wynne - don't change anything about yourself, because you're a great friend and an endearing personality - though sometimes your split personalities do get pretty insane and inane, but only in humour, never on my nerves. Thanks for being such an angel.

To Bel - thanks for organising so many events this year for us all, from National Day where we were waving flags and singing songs while the gambling gods were playing in the background; to the volleyball training sessions (we are very professional) and the gathering on the 31st (which I won't be able to attend due to a Genting trip)! And thanks for your invaluable company - and this as well:

Striking the best Agassi/Federer/Safin/Hewitt pose.

They fooled everybody - almost.

How often do you question what you read? My history tutor certainly impressed on me that crucial skill: always question the source, whether it is a first-hand or second-hand account, what ideological, cultural or historical bias may be surreptitiously ingrained in the text, how the passages are framed and phrased, and what feelings or thoughts it is trying to elicit from the reader.

Jamilgate has had the bloggers talking for quite a few weeks since Flopping Aces posted that tremendously revelatory article that pointed towards a certain "Captain Jamil Hussein" that Associated Press had used in not one, not two, but sixty-one separate articles across the time frame of two years.

The AP cited him as the key source of a November 24 AP story in which it was reported six Sunnis were burned alive by a Shia mob as they departed a mosque in the Baghdad neighborhood of Hurriya.

Soon after the AP reported the story, U.S. and Iraqi officials dismissed the report as false and said they had no record of an Iraqi police captain by the name of Jamil Hussein.

The AP issued strong statements in defense of its original report and provided additional reporting quoting anonymous witnesses who claimed to have seen the disputed episode.

According to two CPATT officials--one in the U.S, one in Iraq--there is no one named "Jamil Hussein" working now or ever at either at the Yarmouk or al Khadra police stations. That is what they have said all along and nothing has changed.

The Baghdad-based CPATT officer says there is no "Sgt. Jamil Hussein" at Yarmouk, which contradicts what Marc Danziger's contacts found. I have another military source on the ground who works with the Iraqi Army (separate and apart from the CPATT sources) and is checking into whether anyone named "Jamil Hussein" has ever worked at Yarmouk.

The warbloggers' strawman is built around the claim that if the AP hadn't reported the Burned Alive story, which was no more than a few sentences within a larger here's-the-carnage-from-Baghdad-today article, then Americans would still gladly support the war in Iraq. That it was somehow the contested Burned Alive story that swung public opinion on Iraq, not the three years' worth of bad news.

Chasing the Burned Alive story down a rabbit's hole, giddy warbloggers deliberately ignore the hundreds of Iraqi civilians who are killed each week, the thousands who are injured, and the tens of thousands who try to flee the disintegrating country. None of that matters. Only Burned Alive matters, as if an AP retraction would change a thing on the ground in Baghdad, where electricity remains scarce, but sectarian death squads roam freely.

Because he doesn’t care if the story’s bogus or not. He’ll say en passant that he does because he knows, as a journalist and media critic, that he has to. But it’s strictly pro forma. His position seems to be that the story’s true in the Larger Sense, as a microcosm of the brutality in Iraq, even if it’s not, you know, technically true (”as if an AP retraction would change a thing on the ground in Baghdad, where electricity remains scarce, but sectarian death squads roam freely”). In other words, “fake but accurate.”

[...] On the contrary, it’s Boehlert who’s using the war as a fig leaf for yet another credible accusation of shoddy, possibly ideologically motivated war journalism. He’d have you believe that to challenge this report is, essentially, to be guilty of historical revisionism, which is not only ironic vis-a-vis the AP but a nifty way of cowing a critic into backing off. It’s more important that Michelle Malkin be wrong, you see, than knowing for sure whether the world’s biggest news agency is passing off crap stories about the most important issue of our time.

Talk about hubris -- stateside warbloggers claim they have a better handle on what's happening in Iraq than reporters who are actually there.

That movement from watchdog to 'advocate' changed the way the MSM viewed itself, viewed its role and viewed the Public. Taking the elitist academic and Socialist viewpoint, the People became the Masses which needed to be 'educated'. Thus the movement from complex reporting to simpler and simplistic reporting, so as to drive these 'Stories' beyond the lowest common denominator to the lowest possible denominator so as to treat the Public as morons. Over time this has led from actual, factual based reporting of times past, to something that is more akin to 'reporting on rumors'. Some of this is driven by the media type, itself, with limited 'air time' pushing to soundbites and reduction of ideas to little tidbits. If it can't fit in 30 seconds, then it goes unreported as *news*. Then 20 seconds. Then 15 seconds. Then 10 seconds. Soon we will be down to the Blipvert and people exploding in their chairs as the information gets compressed down to non-comprehensible noise.

An unsightly demise of the sick man of the Middle East.

Snuffed out - that should be the fate of the militias in Iraq if we are to envision some semblance of security and absence of violence (I hesitate to use the word "peace" in such precarious times) that does not predicate itself on the self-defeatism of appeasement with sectarianism, Iranian hegemony and anti-nationalism.

It seems a bit too late to regret our past failures to rein in the militias and demand their disarmament and dismantlement before al-Sadr rose from obscurity to almost unrivalled prominence as the dominant political and religious authority in Iraq; now that the militias have entrenched themselves as the monopoliser of legitimated force in the name of the law of the land, and the unquenchable thirst for revanchism by Shiites is being fuelled so relentlessly like a frenzied self-catalysing mechanism of sectarianism, visions of irredentism have been awakened. al-Sadr wants to purge the Sunnis and claim all neighbourhoods for Shiites and Shiites only.

As whit helpfully suggested:

Our only hope is to convince the Iraqi government to support a crackdown on all militias, al-Qaeda, the Baathists and the thousands of common criminals.

1. Tactical Independence. The soldiers are gathering their own intelligence, are planning and executing operations independently. They are able to adjust planning on the fly. An perhaps most importantly, they are independently developing intelligence section at the company level. Counterinsurgency is largely a war of intelligence.

   Tactically proficient. The Iraqi Army is executing patrols, ambushes, raids, snap entry control points, manning the Entry Control Points. The soldiers are excellent at identifying IED indicators - the signs IEDs have been planted nearby. “There's only 3 or 4 times where I made specific recommendations to my company in my 4 ½ months here,” said Lieutenant Turner.

   I would be inclined to term this as the first phase, but somehow that engenders the dread that comes with such recommendations - for every first phase, there is a second phase and so on. However, now that we've trained the first batch of Iraqi troops, we can gradually introduce the concept of Iraqis training Iraqis as the second, third and future waves are incorporated into the Army.
   
   Our focus should shift away from training; instead, devolve such responsibilities to the Iraqis themselves. A considerable influx of specialised advisors, logistical support and embeds should be accommodated in order to nurture a more deferential and trusting attitude towards the concept of Iraqis making decisions and consulting us if they need help, and not the other way round.
   

   Cultural Awareness. The Iraqi soldier's ability to speak the language, understand the culture and identify foreigners and other suspicious activities far outweighs any tactical shortcomings when compared to Marines or U.S. soldiers. This advantage cannot be overstated.
   
   Changing attitudes. The younger officers (majors, captain and lieutenant) are more willing to shed the command driven problems inherent in Arab armies, according to the members of the MTT team. And while I was not able to identify a specific program to promote the leadership and development of NCOs within the battalion, the MTTs stated the NCOs are taking on a greater leadership role within the units, but nowhere near like NCOs within the U.S. military. I personally witnessed Iraqi NCOs take the lead during patrol in Fallujah, directing elements within the patrol while the lieutenant was occupied with other tasks. (Note: the Iraqi Army does have an NCO academy).

2. How do we reinforce the Iraqi Army's sense of duty, loyalty and patriotism?
   

   Pay. Some soldiers and officers haven't been paid in over a year. Some soldiers are talking about leaving the Army if they are not paid soon. The lower ranks strongly suspect senior officers are pocketing their pay. Soldiers that have left the military are also kept on the rolls and their paychecks are often pocketed by officers and ministry officials.
   
   Leave policy. This is directly related to pay problems, a lack of an enlistment contract, and a non-existent central banking system. As there is no central banking system, soldiers must physically take their paychecks home. They are forced to travel home unarmed (the weapons are needed at the units, and there is fear the soldiers would sell the weapons), and the soldiers become targets for death squads.

   As Bill remarks:
   

   The Iraqi government risks losing seasoned and motivated soldiers to problems as simple as pay and equipment. The Iraqi Army soldiers are willing to fight, and it would be criminal to lose these troops. While providing pay or equipment may be viewed as a step back and an increase in dependency on the U.S., but this is a small price to pay to maintain the cohesion of the army.

   War budgetary concerns and funding should be addressed to ensuring that the Iraqi troops get paid on time, and with monetary incentives they can't refuse. Perhaps we can entice the militias over with this approach, but let's not repeat our mistakes of foolishly incorporating them whole into the Army.
   
   Lay down preconditions of disarmament, relinquishment of allegiances to sects (or turn them into informants) and just to play it safe, disperse them into multifarious divisions of the Army to safeguard against them abandoning the Army once they get their hands on weapons, equipment and armour.
   
   The crucial element in this is that the incorporation of militias must be voluntary - other than that, we should not feel inhibited in any manner to fully support the Iraqi Army in cracking down on the remaining militias.
   
   
3. With Iraqis embracing their significant roles of ensuring internal security, our troops are therefore able to relinquish these seemingly ill-fitted responsibilities - especially when Iraqis themselves know the lay of the land better than we do - and thus be available for border security, logistical support and Quick Reaction Forces.
   
   The "surge" that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been considering for the past few days needs to be justified and proven that it will not simply result in more body bags. Of course, all guarantees are off, but as I commented at The Glittering Eye:
   

   [...] we definitely don’t want to provide more targets for the death squads and insurgents to shoot at, but at the same time, troops should be relocated to the Iranian and Syrian borders and away from policing/patrolling duties. The surge would be better employed if it were specifically assigned to fulfil border reinforcement and QRF responsibilities - adopt the ROE of the land, of the militias.

   Andy chimed in:
   

   I’m glad you mentioned border enforcement, because that is another key piece of defeating the insurgents. In large measure the insurgency in Afghanistan would be over were it not for the difficulty in controlling the border with Pakistan. In Iraq, I agree that US troops should bolster the border to at least hinder cross-border insurgent activity.

   Ken Pollack suggests that:
   

   Another one that we've looked at is the possibility of establishing safe havens and buffer zones along Iraq's borders. Refugees are a huge issue in civil wars, not just because of the humanitarian obligation but also because refugees create strategic problems. They are one of the principal ways that civil war spreads from one country to the next. Again, Jordan, Lebanon, Congo, potentially Afghanistan, all demonstrated this. [emphasis added]

   And so you've got to find a way to deal with the refugees, keep them inside the country, feed them, care for them, prevent them from becoming recruiting grounds for militias and terrorists, prevent them from becoming targets for groups inside the civil war. And that means taking a very active role in not only housing, caring for them, but also protecting them and disarming them.

   And simultaneously, you also want to control the borders as best you can to prevent terrorists moving back and forth, to prevent militias moving back and forth, and also to prevent the neighbors from invading . . . It is something you see time and again in these kinds of civil wars.

Abdullah probably fears that the current intellectual argument that this is indeed a world war between Shiites and Sunnis will gain credence and support within Jordan itself and drag it unwillingly into sectarian conflict - opening the floodgates for Palestinian terrorists to perpetuate not just a Black September but a Black Year, or Decade. You get the idea.

That explains why he is quick to point out the localised natures of conflict: of THREE separate civil wars instead of a global struggle for religious domination within Islam.

Abdullah hoped al-Maliki would have ideas for Bush on how to be "inclusive" in bringing together different groups in Iraq.

"And they need to do it now, because, obviously, as we're seeing, things are beginning to spiral out of control ... there needs to be some very strong action taken on the ground there today," he said.

Abdullah expects Maliki to do a Black September in Iraq. Not a chance.

Scapegoating the US while ignoring the core problem that is Iran only serves to cover Abdullah's behind, but the king himself doesn't realise by drawing the cloak of delusion over himself and Jordanians, he's not going to see what's coming when Iran decides to work on Jordan and Egypt. By work, I don't mean diplomatically.

Turkey and Iran announced that the two nations have established a bilateral "commission" to combat "Kurdish" terrorism. The commission will deal with the PKK and the Iranian PEJAK (PKK in Iran). It is unclear exactly what the commission will do. However, Turkish officials reported that there are groups in Iran that have called for "joint operations" (ie, Turkish and Iranian troops operating together) against Kurdish separatists. Approximately four million Kurds live in Iran. Six million Kurds live in Iraq. From twelve to fifteen million (depending on the source of the figures) live in Turkey. [emphasis added]

Secession breeds secessionism. One country or one group secedes and if they achieve any degree of success, it can often start a chain reaction. We saw this in Yugoslavia starting with the Slovenians just setting off a chain reaction all through the other Yugoslav communities. And we've seen it elsewhere in the world, in the Caucuses, for example.

The paper urges a "surge" of many thousands more US troops into Baghdad beginning in March, 2007 for one more grand roll of the iron dice. The concept seems to be based on the notion that Shia militias exist because of Sunni violence against them rather than as expressions of a Shia drive to political dominance in Iraq. Based on that belief the authors seem to believe that if the additional US and Iraqi forces to be employed in the Capital area defeat (destroy?) the Sunni insurgent groups, then the Shia militia armies will "wither away" from a lack of need. I do not think that belief is justified.

[...] The carnage implicit in this concept would be appalling. The authors have much to say about the consequences of defeat in Iraq, but, I wonder if they have contemplated what it would be like to fail in their climactic battle and still be required by '43 to stay in Iraq.

First, putting aside all the nice langauge and pretty diagrams, Kagan's plan is for the destruction and demolition of the suburbs where Shia reside, and the killing of every male of military age they can find, armed or not.

That is what the phrases "Rapid Clearing operations" and "Disarm the militias" means. It means genocide and war crimes.

It will start with encirclement or a given suburb to prevent escape and then commence with artillery firing cluster munitions, followed by tanks, bulldozers and mounted troops whose mission is to kill anything that moves.

Those that survive will be a few women and children, and Kagan's plan is that they will only be assisted to reconstruct their existence if they promise to be good.

Off with his head - as the sans-culottes would say!

The aftermath of the bloodless dismemberment of the ISG has spawned several approaches, some of which have proved salient and powerful - speaking of tough measures and backing the president to the hilt - enough to inspire at least a modicum of restrained, cautious hope that we might be able to rescue Iraq from the chasm of perpetual instability and chaos.

First order of the day: ensuring a controlled environment, a euphemism for guaranteeing Iraqi sovereignty. Marc Schulman, who has been savvy enough to posit his proposal at American Future:

• Improved security is the precondition for political compromise.


• Political compromise is the precondition for improved security.

In other words, what comes first—the chicken or the egg?

Anyone who claims that he knows which of these propositions is correct is either a genius or a fool, with the latter being far more likely. Far more important, any American policy based on one or the other of the two propositions has a good chance of being wrong.

It follows, then, that American policy shouldn't be predicated on either proposition.

The U.S. government should issue an ultimatum to Prime Minister Maliki. The ultimatum should state that the U.S. will enlarge its troop commitment for a designated period of time, subject to the following conditions: (1) our military actions will not be subject to review by the government of Iraq, (2) our rules of engagement will be eased, and (3) the Iraqi government will issue a detailed agenda for reconciliation negotiations that will begin simultaneously with the buildup of American forces.

If the Iraqi government rejects the ultimatum, American forces will be immediately redeployed from Baghdad and other population centers to Iraq’s borders with Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. As I discussed in my “Quarantine Iraq” post of last August, the intent of this redeployment will be to prevent the ingress and egress of terrorists and the establishment of terrorist training camps. We will wash our hands of the civil war, leaving the Shi’a and the Sunnis free to kill each other, while acting in our national interest.

1. Secure Iraq’s borders, air and port traffic critical to smuggling, and oil fields and pipelines to the extent possible and feasible. Charge a % of take for securing Iraq’s oil fields and a demand a long-term contract for our being there.

2. Quit plussing up the Iraqis on our military and policing methods. When the next Iraqi govs turn on us or on other oil producing nations, we might rue our well-intentioned efforts at making them more efficient.

3. Shrug and grin over the reports of many, MANY mystery explosions in Iran and Syria, surprise IEDs on Iranian roads and targeted assassinations in Damascus.

4. Harass in court, cyber hijack or vigorously compete with Iranian and Syrian commercial and banking interests to weaken them.

5. Stoke the Palestinian civil war.

6. Offer really significant tax breaks to US businesses and consumers who consume less energy.

7. Go ahead and tax gasoline, all revenues of which would be dedicated to an increase in Army and Marine manpower and tied to Congressional non-mil spending cuts of the same amount in a 2-for-1 that discourages oil dependence and builds our mil reserves.

So here is the juice.

• The US threatens all parties with a draw down in Iraq.
  
  
• The President lets all parties know that Iran will not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons. He demands tough sanctions. The Russians will not play. Ignore them. Better yet punish them. How? Read on.
  
  
• The US demands that the Saudis break out of any restraint on oil production. Tell them in no uncertain terms that the US is leaving. Tell them that the US is sick of the Middle East and if the Saudis do not play hardball by cranking the oil, they will have to solve their own problems. If they do not , someone else may wind up pumping their oil.

The expected results would be:

1. Oil prices would drop.
   
2. Russia would be given a hard lesson of their own making and would lose oil revenue.
3. Iran would face tough economic sanctions and reduced oil money. Iran would be exposed to her own vulnerabilities and face lessened prestige in the Middle East.
4. Conversely, Saudi Arabia would appear to be sending a message to Iran as to who is uncle in the Middle East.
   
5. The Europeans would get economic benefits with lower oil prices during winter.
6. China would not object to lower oil prices.
7. The US could promise a new cooperative effort to engage the Sunnis and balance to parties in Iraq.

The objection will immediately be raised, "What if it seems we need to stay longer? What if our calculations show the new government will have a much better chance of sustaining itself if we stay a few more months?"

No hard and fast rule can be set that we never stay longer, because every situation is different. But two powerful objections must be posed to any extension. The first is the probable political situation at home. If any administration that approves an intervention ends up paying for it with its political life, we will very seldom intervene anywhere, regardless of what interests we have at stake. Politicians are quick learners where holding onto office is concerned. Prolonged interventions, with the steady dribble of casualties they invariably involve, have very high political costs. [emphasis added]

The second objection relates to the country where we have intervened. We live in a world in which the nationalism that arose in Europe in response to the French Revolution has spread almost universally. Any foreign presence rubs this nationalism the wrong way. The longer we stay, the more we assist our opponents in preaching the case for a national war. If they succeed in that, we will be defeated. It is relatively easy, in much of the developing world, to defeat a government and its army. It is extraordinarily difficult to defeat a people. [emphasis added]

One of the main concepts of the proposed operational doctrine--waiting until the enemy has transformed himself from a guerrilla force into a government--is based on avoiding a people's war.

If he persists in his old behavior, back we come for another decapitation.

A rosy-white Christmas beckons.

My feet are pretty tired right now, after today's shopping marathon in the heart of the city. I know, you're thinking it's absolutely insane to even attempt to try and manoeuvre your way through the throngs - no, hordes - of excited/jaded shoppers. But in Singapore, that's the only way you're going to get your gifts, so we might as well make the most of it.

From the start, we already had trouble getting on the escalator exiting the MRT station. It was a deluge of frenzied, impatient shoppers who used every tactic in the book possible to gain half an inch ahead of the next inattentive person who was foolish enough to allow a gap between himself and the person in front.

Kinokuniya beckoned, and we answered - to the tune of $90 in total! Sure, the guilt set in pretty quickly, but it subsided with each look at the new, freshly printed books that we bought.

I purchased this book:

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq

Feet on sand, ball in hand.

First of all, thanks for Pat, Ming Wei and Brose for making it for our rarely-held all-guys beach outing today - it was really good to get back on the beach, feel the coarse, scorching sand beneath our feet, taste the salty seawater and take in the beachside atmosphere!

I have never been so delighted at watching my back being sunburned. Weird thought, I know.

Just found another of Jay Chou's songs - "Tui Hou":

...and I've realised that he likes to elbow his opponents; Hebe is undeniably perfect for this role - she is simply adorable!

This morning, I couldn't resist the temptation of watching the latest episode of Cook Islands, and our dear Parvati was booted out after attempting to cozy up to Ozzy and failing to persuade him to switch to her side.

Note that Becky actually had the initiative to pull Yul aside and warn him of Ozzy's dominance at the challenges - this just goes to show that many have inaccurately portrayed her as simply a follower riding on Yul's coattails. Sure, her alliance with Yul has insulated her from any potential boot, but you could say the same for Yul to that extent. Also, Becky is probably more cunning and strategic than the editing shows - which may mean that she might fare well at F3 - unless of course, she's going against Yul or Ozzy, either of whom or both would grace the F3.

Yul is so golden for F3, which seems like a given that everyone has gradually come to accept since the revelation by Jeff that the Jury would start with Brad. He still has the HII - amazingly enough, considering that he had literally blatantly paraded it in front of everyone - and thus is safe from the vote up till and through F4, which means he is set for F3. Sundra and Becky are way too loyal to turn on him right now - they need his vote against Ozzy at F4.

The thing I notice about Yul is that he is just about the most intelligent and amazing player ever to grace Survivor - not only has he displayed his unrivalled prowess at strategizing, he has thought about how to ingratiate himself with the Jury, plus he's a nice guy who knows how to speak for himself (take that, Candice!). He's incredibly rational - just like Jonathan, my other pick for best strategic player this season - and the key to appeasing his opponents whom he is going to vote out is this:

He basically approaches his adversary in a very rational, analytical manner. All talk about negative emotions, grudges, hatred, disgust are absent. He shares with his opponent how exactly he perceives him as a threat, and how it would serve his interest first and foremost. Not only does the opponent respect Yul's honesty and intellect, he becomes partly convinced that his butt getting kicked out is purely strategic and rational for someone in Yul's position to execute.

The only gripe is that Yul shouldn't have gone over to the tent to tell Adam not to try and flip Ozzy. I mean, the guy is the outsider - what do you expect him to do? I'm kind of pleased that at least Adam is trying his best to be optimistic and not lose his spirit - who knows, he might be the one to steal Immunity from under Ozzy's nose next week and guarantee himself a place in F4. I wouldn't be bothered the least bit if that happened.

Ozzy has played a really good game, allowing Yul to take the heat from everyone not on his alliance, even Jeff! What was he doing when he questioned Yul's intentions regarding Jonathan's hat? Either this is outright sabotage or Jeff is just trying to show everyone on the Jury that Yul's playing the game to win - every angle, every base he will cover. As for Ozzy, he has been very quiet, and his run at the challenges is preventing his alliance from turning on him.

Yet I doubt he will be able to keep on winning. Two more challenges remain before F3 - he has to only lose one for him to be gone. Even Terry last season had to concede some losses to Aras and Danielle. Sure, it would be deserving for Ozzy to reach F3, but then again, Yul seems bound to capture most - if not all - of the Jury votes.

To recap, the Jury now consists of: Brad, Rebecca, Jenny, Nate, Candice, Jonathan, Parvati

Let's say the most probable F3 occurs: Yul-Becky-Ozzy

Yul: Brad, Candice, Jonathan, Adam
Ozzy: Nate, Parvati
Becky: (probably might get 0-2 votes)

Undecided:
Sundra (bitter? More inclined to Yul and Becky than Ozzy)
Jenny (trusts Yul? Then again, never really had a chance to get to know any of them - so might go for the strategic vote - which means Yul)

Probable verdict: Yul wins by 2 votes or more over Ozzy.

If they get rid of Ozzy: Yul-Becky-Sundra

I have a feeling that Yul will take it all.

Any other scenario is less probable, and I don't think Adam can win Immunity at F5 or 4. Yul has been Ozzy's closest competitor in almost every challenge and so with Ozzy gone at F5, Yul will probably win at F4 and boot Adam.

Come Monday, the winner of Survivor: Cook Islands will be known.

Go Yul-Becky-Sundra!

The shower room - or so it seemed.

Recently, Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hosted a conference about the Holocaust - a human tragedy so intensely unimaginable and horrific that was perpetuated by the xenophobic, ultra-racist Adolf Hitler during his reign as Fuhrer.

The aims of the conference were to provide a forum for those who wished to question several aspects of the Holocaust, or even whether the Holocaust actually took place. Yes, you must be shaking your head right now: how one could denounce this as a Jewish conspiratorial attempt to justify Israel's existence in the Middle East is unconscionably condemnable.

David Duke, one of the more distinguished (but nonetheless ignorant and incredibly delusional) guests at the conference had a conversation with CNN's Wolf Blitzer, and there he basically used his screentime to ramble on about Jewish conspiracies and masterminds, including a very noble but utterly inexplicable attempt to defend Ahmadinejad.

In case you haven't heard, the Iranian president is the same man who called for Israel to be wiped off the map, has continued to fund Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon and is currently pursuing a nuclear programme - all with the unmistakeably insidious intention of completely obliterating Israel from the region.

Back to David Duke's spiel:

Out of curiosity as to what madness had transpired and corrupted the mind of this former Ku Klux Klan "Imperial Wizard" (probably a euphemism for "cell group leader"), I visited Duke's very own website. Here's what he had to say about himself and his self-aggrandising, chest-thumping post regarding the CNN interview:

But the use of the term Ku Klux Klan about a dozen times backfired on Blitzer when I simply refused to just sit there and take it. It afforded me an opportunity to expose Blitzer’s extreme Zionist background, and show how the Jewish extremist media portrays me in this biased way because they have a Jewish extremist agenda.

[...] Blitzer of course is a Jewish extremist employee of AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the extremist Israel lobby that threatens and bribes thousands of politicians across America...The lighting for my shot was horrendous. With bad lighting it is easy to make one seem sinister. Blitzer of course was bathed in nice soft light like an angel.

In an act of blatant deception, the Zionist-influenced media has headlined that in the closing session Iran’s President called for “wiping Israel off the map,” suggesting that he advocated a genocide or destruction of the people of Israel. One more big lie. Any tape or transcript of his speech will show that he said support around the world for Zionism is dwindling and that the Zionist Regime will be replaced by a democratic state in the same fashion that the Soviet Regime was dissolved in Russia. He specifically advocated complete civil and political rights for all residents of the region, and specifically mentioned protection for the complete civil rights for Jews and Palestinians alike, and he repeatedly stressed that all peoples should love and respect one another and must disavow violence and war.

How the Zionist media lies! Thank God we have an Internet where people can immediately learn the truth. Ten years ago these lies could be stated with no fear of contradiction, now you can hear with your own ears the truth rather than the lies of a pro-Israel media.

For the non-psychotic, conspiracy theories can offer the same kind of balm. Our world is increasingly chaotic. At its best we experience the world rushing into the future sweeping us along in a rapidly changing dynamic equilibrium; those of us who are most adaptable can surf the bow front of the wave of change; many more are able to follow along just past the crest, but for those who have less agility, such rapid change is disorienting and anxiety producing. Because of the increasing complexity of the modern world we all are constantly at the mercy of strangers...In such a complex world, we are as out of control as the most primitive and superstitious Caveman, whose life was at the mercy of events both large (storms, lightning bolts, earthquakes and tsunamis) and small (smilodons, infections, broken bones). In such a terrifying world, our anxiety leads us to imagine that some all-powerful individual (at one time thought to be God, but he has been devalued by modern, secular sophisticates who keep themselves unaware of the primitive nature of our minds) or individuals, are actually in control.

A random world is not only terrifying but poorly comprehensible; a world controlled by secret cabals of Jews, Americans, the CIA, multinationals, or some other nefarious grouping, may be frightening, but at least it is understandable...If the world is filled with uncertainty, we are all at risk; if there are hidden cabals controlling the world, we can feel safer by either staying out of their sights, or by attacking them as the cause of our problems. Either way, we can feel less anxious and uncertain.

Lochness...not! (but a giant octopus is just as scary)


Just caught Flags of Our Fathers, a film depicting the storming of Iwo Jima during the Second World War. I must say, this is one personal take on the atrocities and horrors of war; I've watched quite a few war flicks, but this one isn't your usual blockbustery CGI-chockfull extravaganza - none of the romanticism of war, yet unbelievably gritty and real.

Clint Eastwood is a genius. This movie is something like Mystic River in that Eastwood focuses his story on three protagonists and works the plot from those perspectives in create a more cohesive storyline. It is probably only one of two war films that strikes home the terrifying nature of war (the other being Soldiers of Salamina), and even though it was pretty lengthy, the movie hit all the right notes.

Just as the movie opened my eyes to exactly how terrible and personal war can become (even the word "war" sounds too huge and distant a concept to truly grasp as something close and intimate), the American troops that ventured forth into the valley found themselves at the mercy of Japanese encampments and secret hideyholes dotting the sides of the valley. The guns and cannons simply rained down on the soldiers who were scrambling for cover - it was terrible to watch them being exposed to mass slaughter.

And each time someone was asked to fetch a signal line or even a simple errand, one wonders how he would have handled the possibility that it might be the last time he would see his comrade. That feeling of helplessness, being at the mercy of greater forces - that can only be understood when you are out there risking life and limb for your friends.

Too often during the film did I witness as each friend that they acknowledged and embraced through conversation, jokes and camaraderie was cut down almost mercilessly and abruptly by shrapnel or bullet. The transition from watching that youthful face degenerate into a paroxysm of fear and disbelief - it is hard to reconcile, and even harder to accept. Yet that is the reality of war.

Here is a poem by Wilfred Owen - he wrote this after witnessing the horrors of the First World War:

Wilfred Owen

Dulce Et Decorum Est

Bent double, like old beggars under sacks,
Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge,
Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs
And towards our distant rest began to trudge.
Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots
But limped on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind;
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots
Of disappointed shells that dropped behind.

GAS! Gas! Quick, boys!-- An ecstasy of fumbling,
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time;
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling
And floundering like a man in fire or lime.--
Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.

In all my dreams, before my helpless sight,
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.

If in some smothering dreams you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,--
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.

Blood will have to be spilt.


Despite the sobering mood that has been in the air since Bush postponed his address to the nation, here's Part II of At The Gates of Fantasyland. [read Part I here]

Train, train, train

Training – that seems to be the one-stop, miracle drug for the malaise that is plaguing Iraq: simply “increase the extent and levels of training” by American military personnel and advisors to those who seem to lack the resources and skills necessary to counter the nefarious insurgency, which has metamorphosed from a purely Baathist-aQ Sunni front to that of a sophisticated, semi-autonomous anarchical system of ethnic cleansing perpetuated under the guise of legitimacy.

As for the recommendation that there has to be an increase in the number of US troops, we have to ensure that this isn't just a short-term measure that would simply result in more targets for the death squads and insurgents to trip over one another to kill.

There needs to be a significant change in our approach (as suggested by observers):

1. US advisors should be embedded into Iraqi divisions, while our troops are pulled back in order to forge a Quick Reaction Force, ready to respond should either the commander of that division or the advisor attached to him feel the necessity to call for additional forces.
   
   

2. Allow the Iraqi Army to take on the responsibility of border policing between provinces and towns; communications made possible between the patrols and the main command so that the divisions or the QRF can be mobilised within localised, bounded territory.
   
   

3. Counter-insurgency operations be left to the QRF (which should be initially comprised of a majority of US troops), which should attempt to selectively recruit potential Iraqi commanders and familiarise them with such operations – in other words, embed them into the QRF and see what they can learn, and more importantly, what advice they can contribute.
   
   

4. Embedding should take place at every level from this initial phase – sectarian bias is still prevalent and pervasive, and we need to purge the police and army of such chaos-mongers without hesitation.

The ISG report is chock-full of recommendation after recommendation, calling for increased budgets to provide training to the Iraqi Army and the police, but fails to address the problem at hand: do the Iraqis even need training in the first place?

As M. Takhallus remarks,

So, here's where we are: we have trained the Iraqi police to be more effective death squads, we have trained the Iraqi army to always have something better to do when the trouble starts, and we have 140,000 men trying all alone to control a nation of 25 million.

Iraqis already are all too familiar with the art of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and they don’t need training of any sort. Just look at how effectively autonomously operating death squads, militias and cells run around carrying out sophisticated reprisal attacks and what not.

Dolchstosslegende

Sunni insurgents are more than capable of retaliating and punishing Shiite sectarian cells for their actions than the Iraqi Army, the MNF and US troops combined (and vice versa) – and thus both Shiites and Sunnis answer not to the central authority of Maliki but are instead beholden to their sects because they can always count on their religious antithesis to resort to ever escalating acts of violence, thus giving them casus belli to retaliate in the most disproportionate manner possible.

No ceasefires, no armistices, no negotiations. Both have accepted the seemingly eventual scenario of only one side surviving the slaughterfest; to accept any compromise is to cede to the enemy. Why have we not learnt that this is the only possible manner in which to conduct this war?

As I commented over at the EB with regard to this “manner”:

Only a complete "victory" (I apologise for the hyperbolic cliché) would represent a clean break from the past.

Our stasis and hesitance to seek tougher, more uncompromising measures have allowed others to ingratiate themselves with the Iraqis and prove to them that they are more trustworthy, more capable of ensuring their security, and most importantly, most well-positioned to act upon their revanchist sentiments.

A trip down Memory Lane: 1918 - Germany was allowed to sign the armistice with their army and state left intact, and generals like Luderndorf and Hindenburg surreptitiously sought a civilian government to do the dirty deed of signing the armistice, thereby absolving the military of all blame.

The Weimar Republic that emerged from the ashes of the Great War lacked support from all sides, and thus had to depend on the old conservative order of Hindenburg and the German High Command - the authoritarian, militaristic and pre-democratic ideologues that had instigated the war in the first place. The opportunity for a clean break had dissipated, and the powers of Europe would pay a high price 20 years down the road.

Dolchstosslegende, or "stab in the back". That's what Hitler accused the Weimar "November criminals" of doing to Germany when they wrote off their victories over Russia prior to defeat.

What can we learn from this? If we save the Sunnis, the Shiites are going to accuse us of supporting the insurgency and undermining the government, thereby betraying democratic principles and our pledge to Maliki will be well null and void. We would lose ALL credibility and therefore lose what little leverage we have in Iraq.

If we continue supporting the Shiites, it would probably engender a Sadrist state that may possibly struggle with Iranian intentions of turning Iraq into a proxy state. Either way, we would be increasingly beholden and dependent on the militias and death squads for security and peace in Iraq.

We would be betraying our very own nation in the process if we allowed traitors like the ISG, Baker and Gates to eat the crappy sandwich which they intend to mass-produce and sell at all participating outlets in America. Unfortunately, our call for dolchstosslegende has not been recognised.

Militia or Army – pick one

At the BC just a few weeks ago, I attempted to expound on exactly how entrenched support has been for the militias, and why we're going to have to face up to the reality if we choose to continue on this path:

Maliki's position in the government is contingent on the Sadrists' support and clout in parliament, and with full clarity on that issue, Maliki's actions are more or less constrained by al-Sadr's opinions about how to run the state institutions.

With Shiite and Sunni death squads running rampant, the consensus among Iraqis is that they want some form of security - Maliki's nationalised army forces have failed miserably not because of their competency or lack of proper arms and training but because of the historical preference for militias. Call it tribal privatisation, or what we call mercenary forces that were hired by the US to protect its installations in the early days of the war in Iraq.

Of course, "consensus" among Iraqis disguises the fact that the majority are Shiites and obviously would not blink at the prospect of legitimising al-Sadr's genocidal cleansing of Sunnis.

Yet this façade of internal security masking pure sectarianism is a thin veneer - it is another legal fiction that the US is pressured and seemingly reluctant, but willing, to accept: to legitimise Maliki's government is to devolve authoritative power to al-Sadr.

The militias aren't just going to go away - internal sovereignty has been compromised, diffused through al-Sadr's privatisation of death squads as a direct challenge to the stooge of the US that is the Iraqi army. al-Sadr's Mahdi Army has been murderously efficient and seeks not to supplant its Iraqi counterpart, but retain it as an unpalatable comparison, taking all the blame for the chaos and anarchy.

The Sadrists know that they are the government, and that Maliki serves as a figurehead, a fig leaf of legitimacy that the US has no choice but to accept because it is the genuine manifestation of the Democratic ideal.

al-Sadr has legitimately seized the task of self-defence, to enforce security - the right to wield unlimited power within its borders to enforce security (though his hatred for Sunnis is unforgivable). He has exploited and entrenched his party in parliament, seeking to consecrate majoritarianism through public consensus to marginalise the Sunnis at every attempt - what we would term adversarialism/partisanship.

Alexis chimes in:

The best approach to these militias is not to disarm them or disband them, but to incorporate them as separate formations outside of the regular military and police forces with federal command over these militias and control over personnel records in federal archives.

Either there will be Sadrist and Shiite militias vying with US and Iraqi Army troops for the role of security - an outcome which will inevitably lead to arguments about competing sovereignties - or the US pulls out, paving the way for al-Sadr's monopoly on security.

RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial and technical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members.

A foolish assumption that the Iraqi government requires even more “financial and technical support” - the ISG expects Maliki to conjure up diplomatic clout to entice the militias towards disarmament.

Only option

As I argued at the BC regarding al-Sadr's possible vested interests:

Collaboration (between Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army) doesn't mean that they share the same ideological objectives, though. No matter how persuasive and palatable Iran's mullahs may be in their sales pitch regarding a Shia Crescent to the Iraqi Shiites, al-Sadr will not sacrifice his sovereign status in the country - not when he has Maliki twirled around his thumb, and the US forced to acquiesce in the horrifying legitimacy of it all.

Now, I'm not going to simply leave it to al-Sadr and trust him not to turn Iraq over to Iran as a proxy state for Arab-US/Shiite-Sunni fault lines to be exploited. Even if he has more parochial concerns, he might not be able to fend off Iranian interventionism. We do not want to leave the fate of the Middle East in al-Sadr's hands, trust me.

From what I can gather, the inevitability of the scenario in which we are forced to back Sadrist militias and death squads in support for Iraqi sovereignty against al-Hakim's Badr Brigades and Iranian hegemony with which it threatens to foist upon Iraqis is evidently already proceeding towards manifestation.

Here's where we abandon – not the Iraqis – our appeasement strategy with the militias, because if we can hardly control factors that are out of our control – in this case, Iran, Syria and possibly the Saudis in the future – then we might as well start eradicating the established patrons of such external aid.

Here I quote Kris Sargent, in his article entitled “Choosing Sides in Iraq”, forcefully demands that:

Nevertheless, make it very clear to the Shiites that this military assistance is wholly dependent on having a single Iraqi chain of command and, as a precondition of this, the absorption of Shiite militias into the Iraqi Army and Police or their outright dissolution. If this is acceded to, make it very clear that anybody who attempts to misappropriate Iraqi government assets—including Army personnel and Police units—for their own purposes, or anybody who attacks Sunnis without express authorization, will be considered guilty of treason, arrested and swiftly tried by an Iraqi military tribunal, and hanged. This applies to former militia leaders and individual members of the government. Arrests will be carried out by the Iraqi military working in conjunction with US forces, or, if the Iraqi military is unable or unwilling to do this, US forces alone. [emphasis added]

[...] If the Shiites will not agree with this, then the Iraqi Shiite government will no longer be able to steer the course of US policy in the country. Explain to them that domestic political pressure has forced our hand, and if the Shiites value revenge over a unified and stable Iraq, then the US stands ready to reduce their militias and place the Iraqi army in receivership (part of Josh Manchester's strategy of "Going Native") In the event the Shiites refuse to play ball, the US will have no choice but to neutralize all sources of instability. But let it be known that, should the Sunnis take advantage of the reduction of the Shiite militias by US forces, the US would be terribly upset, so much so that we might even form a committee or two to express regret at the death of al'Sadr, al'Hakim, and any other former government official who happens to be on the receiving end of a Sunni car bomb. [emphasis added]

Protecting Iraqi sovereignty at all costs

The Shiites either play by our rules, or we deal with them in the only language they understand: force. Shiites, and by extension Sunnis, Kurds and all of Iraq value their nation's sovereignty – heck, even if they don't, we do! Protecting Iraq from being ripped asunder and dismembered ala Czechoslovakia will curb Iranian influence, allow a countervailing force to re-emerge since Saddam was dethroned and re-establish the balance of power in the Middle East – only this time, it won't be Shiite fundamentalism versus Sunni Wahhabism.

As I commented at the BC regarding the dangers of transnational government:

The ISG report expects Iraqis to stabilise their nation without according them the means to do so, or even giving them the guarantee that we'll be there to support them and act as a safety net. Not only that, instead of assuring them of our commitment (or lack thereof), we're introducing foreign intervention that would undoubtedly deprive Iraqis of the means to act upon their sovereignty.

Plus, who's to enforce those restrictions on Syria and Iran, ensure that they are not violating any provision of the Versai...I mean, ISG report? Iran and Syria will inevitably monopolise the regional apparatus of coercion, intimidation and destabilisation to discourage other participants in intervening or upholding all provisions. Iraq will be left vulnerable to direct, legitimised dismemberment.

And we'll have little say at that point in time because Iraqi sovereignty would have degenerated into nothingness ala Lebanon. Expect assassinations, car bombs and Iranian Revolutionary Guard/Hezbollah/Badr/Sadr sit-ins in Baghdad.

A regional forum will eventually expose Iranian and Syrian complicity and invidious intentions in perpetuating such a conflagration to all other Arab regimes. Jordan, Egypt, the Saudis would be disinclined to work within the parameters of the forum because the ISG seems to allow Iran and Syria carte blanche to interfere and violate every inch of sovereignty of any nation in the Middle East.

Without even the other regimes ever likely to commit to upholding the provisions, the ISG report shall inevitably be relegated to the trash bin where it belongs. Or do we want to risk it and deal with appeasement twenty years down the road?

Oh, you know what, we don't have to wait that long. Only till Iran gets their first nuclear weapon.

My proposal is definitely not exhaustive, and neither is it perfect. However, the principle behind the approach I posit is that I intend to devolve sovereignty solely to the Iraqis themselves – without being beholden to external actors, even ourselves – that they are responsible for their own security, their prosperity and fundamentally, their existence as a nation amid the threats of Iranian hegemony and Wahhabist infiltration. Till they learn to focus on the discipline necessary to achieve such an objective, we shall be there with the carrot and the stick – a big one – to guide them.