To The Hilt
In other words, what comes first—the chicken or the egg? Anyone who claims that he knows which of these propositions is correct is either a genius or a fool, with the latter being far more likely. Far more important, any American policy based on one or the other of the two propositions has a good chance of being wrong. It follows, then, that American policy shouldn't be predicated on either proposition. That is exactly why we should avoid depending on the militias to do the dirty business of national security for us. Here is what the President should say in his next speech on Iraq: 
Off with his head - as the sans-culottes would say!
The aftermath of the bloodless dismemberment of the ISG has spawned several approaches, some of which have proved salient and powerful - speaking of tough measures and backing the president to the hilt - enough to inspire at least a modicum of restrained, cautious hope that we might be able to rescue Iraq from the chasm of perpetual instability and chaos.
First order of the day: ensuring a controlled environment, a euphemism for guaranteeing Iraqi sovereignty. Marc Schulman, who has been savvy enough to posit his proposal at American Future:
For the first assumption, therein lies the tendency to believe that we can somehow "improve" security by wishing it. To work out a political solution in Iraq without the necessary use of force to back it up is folly. I remember reading somewhere that "there is no military solution" to Iraq. I beg to differ - deal with the militias, Shiite or Sunni and ensure a clean break from the past history of tribalism, internecine warfare and anarchy. They will compromise with us when before their very eyes, those among them who dared override the Iraqi government are purged - tried, persecuted and executed without remorse. There will be no haven for criminals - or terrorists for that matter.
For the second assumption, we have compromised politically with the Sadrists, allowing them a sizeable portion of the governing pie, while political and military intransigence that has proven so stultifying has basically granted al-Sadr carte blanche to close his grip on internal security. Was there a consummerate decline in violence?
Yes if we were to consider attacks on US troops, but no if we were to view the entire situation from a sectarian perspective. And let's not even talk about the Sunnis, who not only rejected our offer to incorporate them into the government, but sliced off the hand that offered it with glee. The U.S. government should issue an ultimatum to Prime Minister Maliki. The ultimatum should state that the U.S. will enlarge its troop commitment for a designated period of time, subject to the following conditions: (1) our military actions will not be subject to review by the government of Iraq, (2) our rules of engagement will be eased, and (3) the Iraqi government will issue a detailed agenda for reconciliation negotiations that will begin simultaneously with the buildup of American forces.
Our Rules of Engagement are the ones that are hampering us from effective, decisive action against our enemies - if the world community believes that UN peacekeepers can do the job better than the US while ensuring that the Geneva Conventions are not violated, then send them in with their plastic guns and rubber ammunition. Be rid of political correctness, moral equivalence and pretensions of adherence to a higher moral order (the UN).If the Iraqi government rejects the ultimatum, American forces will be immediately redeployed from Baghdad and other population centers to Iraq’s borders with Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. As I discussed in my “Quarantine Iraq” post of last August, the intent of this redeployment will be to prevent the ingress and egress of terrorists and the establishment of terrorist training camps. We will wash our hands of the civil war, leaving the Shi’a and the Sunnis free to kill each other, while acting in our national interest.
Robert Haddick, also known as Westhawk, offers a sound plan: basically, renounce reconciliation with the Sunnis, side with the Shiite majority, devolve responsibility of security to the Iraqi Army:
My only gripe concerns the retaining of al-Sadr and the militias - is it a temporary solution whereby we wean internal sovereignty away from the militias and onto the Iraqi Army, or a long-term panacea?
The plan is sound, that I cannot argue against; but we are assuming that al-Sadr respects Iraqi sovereignty and nationalism more so than Iranian hegemony and the manifestation of the Shiite Caliphate.
I might be wrong in distrusting al-Sadr, but as of now, nobody is to be trusted.
As for policing the borders, Haddick has this to say:The U.S. would have to impose itself on Iraqi sovereignty in one area, by becoming the border patrol on the Iranian frontier. Moving strong U.S. ground forces to the Iranian border would accomplish several things. First, it would intimidate the Iranians. Second, it would attempt to limit Iranian influence inside Iraq. Third, it would make the Shi'ite winners inside Iraq more dependent on the U.S. Fourth, it would reassure other Sunni Arab governments in the region that the U.S. will not abandon them to Iranian domination.
Perhaps this might be viable after all - again, contributing to the controlled environment.
And Catherine's proposal is not to be discounted:1. Secure Iraq’s borders, air and port traffic critical to smuggling, and oil fields and pipelines to the extent possible and feasible. Charge a % of take for securing Iraq’s oil fields and a demand a long-term contract for our being there.
2164th posted this a few days back:
2. Quit plussing up the Iraqis on our military and policing methods. When the next Iraqi govs turn on us or on other oil producing nations, we might rue our well-intentioned efforts at making them more efficient.
3. Shrug and grin over the reports of many, MANY mystery explosions in Iran and Syria, surprise IEDs on Iranian roads and targeted assassinations in Damascus.
4. Harass in court, cyber hijack or vigorously compete with Iranian and Syrian commercial and banking interests to weaken them.
5. Stoke the Palestinian civil war.
6. Offer really significant tax breaks to US businesses and consumers who consume less energy.
7. Go ahead and tax gasoline, all revenues of which would be dedicated to an increase in Army and Marine manpower and tied to Congressional non-mil spending cuts of the same amount in a 2-for-1 that discourages oil dependence and builds our mil reserves.So here is the juice.
Definitely something we could use from that - refining our oil strategy (pun unintended) is crucial, and I'll have to research more on that aspect in order to discuss it.
The expected results would be:
Lind's article (hat tip to Fellow Peacekeeper) makes for a good read, though there are bones of contention that I have picked:The objection will immediately be raised, "What if it seems we need to stay longer? What if our calculations show the new government will have a much better chance of sustaining itself if we stay a few more months?"
Which did not necessarily result in the booting of Republicans from Congress - remember that there was no lever in the voting booth that was labelled "surrender". And weirdly enough, I think the nation is starting to rally around Bush, ready to back him to the hilt should he choose to continue to stay in Iraq. The Democrats would not dare go against public consensus, would they?
No hard and fast rule can be set that we never stay longer, because every situation is different. But two powerful objections must be posed to any extension. The first is the probable political situation at home. If any administration that approves an intervention ends up paying for it with its political life, we will very seldom intervene anywhere, regardless of what interests we have at stake. Politicians are quick learners where holding onto office is concerned. Prolonged interventions, with the steady dribble of casualties they invariably involve, have very high political costs. [emphasis added]
Interestingly enough, political costs have been mitigated, and will continue to be minimised if Bush gets his act together, and the Democrats grudgingly accept that to have any chance to hold onto office beyond 2008, they have to support the president.The second objection relates to the country where we have intervened. We live in a world in which the nationalism that arose in Europe in response to the French Revolution has spread almost universally. Any foreign presence rubs this nationalism the wrong way. The longer we stay, the more we assist our opponents in preaching the case for a national war. If they succeed in that, we will be defeated. It is relatively easy, in much of the developing world, to defeat a government and its army. It is extraordinarily difficult to defeat a people. [emphasis added]
Yet we are not fighting the Iraqi people, but scores of Shiite and Sunni insurgents, death squads and militias. The reason why most Iraqis have not responded resoundingly with al-Sadr's and al-Hakim's calls for the US to leave is that they don't see themselves as a "nation" yet. Tribes and sects come first and foremost when dealing with identity. It might sound like a nationalistic war, but truth be told, if it were truly one, we would have been asked to go a long time ago.One of the main concepts of the proposed operational doctrine--waiting until the enemy has transformed himself from a guerrilla force into a government--is based on avoiding a people's war.
And we have acquiesced in Hamas forming a legitimate government, but has that made it any easier to remove them?
I like this sentence:If he persists in his old behavior, back we come for another decapitation.
Louis Capet certainly paid the price.
Exactly spot on in that we have to rein in factors which we can control, and if ensuring a controlled environment within which Iraqis can operate with sovereignty without being exposed to foreign interference, then this would be it. Even more so, funding has to be stemmed as well, otherwise we might find ourselves nurturing the perpetuity of civil war within Iraq as Saudi and Iranian funds fuel the cycle of death and destruction – effectively disabling the Iraqis to ever enjoy security.
ayne brought up the refugee problem, which has been rather alarming, and so how exactly will we handle this? Hard, brutal choices must be made at the expense of these cross-sect families if we want to achieve some semblance of control over the situation and wrest a modicum of sovereignty from those who would use it to destabilise Iraq.
I’m sceptical about deploying US troops to guard the borders, though. As I suggested, we should bolster the Iraqi Army and allow them to do the policing and patrolling, while our troops would be mainly deployed for Quick Reaction Forces.
Stationing Iraqi troops at the borders with the very real and chillingly plausible possibility that hostile Syrians and Iranians just on the other side of the line can harass and assassinate them – just like how Hezbollah provoked Israel at the Lebanese border – will perhaps make them realise that it is them who are responsible for their national security, and not some amorphously defined, seemingly omnipresent and shock-absorbent (in terms of casualties) US/MNF army.