The Possum Bistro

An unsightly demise of the sick man of the Middle East.

Snuffed out - that should be the fate of the militias in Iraq if we are to envision some semblance of security and absence of violence (I hesitate to use the word "peace" in such precarious times) that does not predicate itself on the self-defeatism of appeasement with sectarianism, Iranian hegemony and anti-nationalism.

It seems a bit too late to regret our past failures to rein in the militias and demand their disarmament and dismantlement before al-Sadr rose from obscurity to almost unrivalled prominence as the dominant political and religious authority in Iraq; now that the militias have entrenched themselves as the monopoliser of legitimated force in the name of the law of the land, and the unquenchable thirst for revanchism by Shiites is being fuelled so relentlessly like a frenzied self-catalysing mechanism of sectarianism, visions of irredentism have been awakened. al-Sadr wants to purge the Sunnis and claim all neighbourhoods for Shiites and Shiites only.

As whit helpfully suggested:

Our only hope is to convince the Iraqi government to support a crackdown on all militias, al-Qaeda, the Baathists and the thousands of common criminals.

1. Tactical Independence. The soldiers are gathering their own intelligence, are planning and executing operations independently. They are able to adjust planning on the fly. An perhaps most importantly, they are independently developing intelligence section at the company level. Counterinsurgency is largely a war of intelligence.

   Tactically proficient. The Iraqi Army is executing patrols, ambushes, raids, snap entry control points, manning the Entry Control Points. The soldiers are excellent at identifying IED indicators - the signs IEDs have been planted nearby. “There's only 3 or 4 times where I made specific recommendations to my company in my 4 ½ months here,” said Lieutenant Turner.

   I would be inclined to term this as the first phase, but somehow that engenders the dread that comes with such recommendations - for every first phase, there is a second phase and so on. However, now that we've trained the first batch of Iraqi troops, we can gradually introduce the concept of Iraqis training Iraqis as the second, third and future waves are incorporated into the Army.
   
   Our focus should shift away from training; instead, devolve such responsibilities to the Iraqis themselves. A considerable influx of specialised advisors, logistical support and embeds should be accommodated in order to nurture a more deferential and trusting attitude towards the concept of Iraqis making decisions and consulting us if they need help, and not the other way round.
   

   Cultural Awareness. The Iraqi soldier's ability to speak the language, understand the culture and identify foreigners and other suspicious activities far outweighs any tactical shortcomings when compared to Marines or U.S. soldiers. This advantage cannot be overstated.
   
   Changing attitudes. The younger officers (majors, captain and lieutenant) are more willing to shed the command driven problems inherent in Arab armies, according to the members of the MTT team. And while I was not able to identify a specific program to promote the leadership and development of NCOs within the battalion, the MTTs stated the NCOs are taking on a greater leadership role within the units, but nowhere near like NCOs within the U.S. military. I personally witnessed Iraqi NCOs take the lead during patrol in Fallujah, directing elements within the patrol while the lieutenant was occupied with other tasks. (Note: the Iraqi Army does have an NCO academy).

2. How do we reinforce the Iraqi Army's sense of duty, loyalty and patriotism?
   

   Pay. Some soldiers and officers haven't been paid in over a year. Some soldiers are talking about leaving the Army if they are not paid soon. The lower ranks strongly suspect senior officers are pocketing their pay. Soldiers that have left the military are also kept on the rolls and their paychecks are often pocketed by officers and ministry officials.
   
   Leave policy. This is directly related to pay problems, a lack of an enlistment contract, and a non-existent central banking system. As there is no central banking system, soldiers must physically take their paychecks home. They are forced to travel home unarmed (the weapons are needed at the units, and there is fear the soldiers would sell the weapons), and the soldiers become targets for death squads.

   As Bill remarks:
   

   The Iraqi government risks losing seasoned and motivated soldiers to problems as simple as pay and equipment. The Iraqi Army soldiers are willing to fight, and it would be criminal to lose these troops. While providing pay or equipment may be viewed as a step back and an increase in dependency on the U.S., but this is a small price to pay to maintain the cohesion of the army.

   War budgetary concerns and funding should be addressed to ensuring that the Iraqi troops get paid on time, and with monetary incentives they can't refuse. Perhaps we can entice the militias over with this approach, but let's not repeat our mistakes of foolishly incorporating them whole into the Army.
   
   Lay down preconditions of disarmament, relinquishment of allegiances to sects (or turn them into informants) and just to play it safe, disperse them into multifarious divisions of the Army to safeguard against them abandoning the Army once they get their hands on weapons, equipment and armour.
   
   The crucial element in this is that the incorporation of militias must be voluntary - other than that, we should not feel inhibited in any manner to fully support the Iraqi Army in cracking down on the remaining militias.
   
   
3. With Iraqis embracing their significant roles of ensuring internal security, our troops are therefore able to relinquish these seemingly ill-fitted responsibilities - especially when Iraqis themselves know the lay of the land better than we do - and thus be available for border security, logistical support and Quick Reaction Forces.
   
   The "surge" that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been considering for the past few days needs to be justified and proven that it will not simply result in more body bags. Of course, all guarantees are off, but as I commented at The Glittering Eye:
   

   [...] we definitely don’t want to provide more targets for the death squads and insurgents to shoot at, but at the same time, troops should be relocated to the Iranian and Syrian borders and away from policing/patrolling duties. The surge would be better employed if it were specifically assigned to fulfil border reinforcement and QRF responsibilities - adopt the ROE of the land, of the militias.

   Andy chimed in:
   

   I’m glad you mentioned border enforcement, because that is another key piece of defeating the insurgents. In large measure the insurgency in Afghanistan would be over were it not for the difficulty in controlling the border with Pakistan. In Iraq, I agree that US troops should bolster the border to at least hinder cross-border insurgent activity.

   Ken Pollack suggests that:
   

   Another one that we've looked at is the possibility of establishing safe havens and buffer zones along Iraq's borders. Refugees are a huge issue in civil wars, not just because of the humanitarian obligation but also because refugees create strategic problems. They are one of the principal ways that civil war spreads from one country to the next. Again, Jordan, Lebanon, Congo, potentially Afghanistan, all demonstrated this. [emphasis added]

   And so you've got to find a way to deal with the refugees, keep them inside the country, feed them, care for them, prevent them from becoming recruiting grounds for militias and terrorists, prevent them from becoming targets for groups inside the civil war. And that means taking a very active role in not only housing, caring for them, but also protecting them and disarming them.

   And simultaneously, you also want to control the borders as best you can to prevent terrorists moving back and forth, to prevent militias moving back and forth, and also to prevent the neighbors from invading . . . It is something you see time and again in these kinds of civil wars.

Abdullah probably fears that the current intellectual argument that this is indeed a world war between Shiites and Sunnis will gain credence and support within Jordan itself and drag it unwillingly into sectarian conflict - opening the floodgates for Palestinian terrorists to perpetuate not just a Black September but a Black Year, or Decade. You get the idea.

That explains why he is quick to point out the localised natures of conflict: of THREE separate civil wars instead of a global struggle for religious domination within Islam.

Abdullah hoped al-Maliki would have ideas for Bush on how to be "inclusive" in bringing together different groups in Iraq.

"And they need to do it now, because, obviously, as we're seeing, things are beginning to spiral out of control ... there needs to be some very strong action taken on the ground there today," he said.

Abdullah expects Maliki to do a Black September in Iraq. Not a chance.

Scapegoating the US while ignoring the core problem that is Iran only serves to cover Abdullah's behind, but the king himself doesn't realise by drawing the cloak of delusion over himself and Jordanians, he's not going to see what's coming when Iran decides to work on Jordan and Egypt. By work, I don't mean diplomatically.

Turkey and Iran announced that the two nations have established a bilateral "commission" to combat "Kurdish" terrorism. The commission will deal with the PKK and the Iranian PEJAK (PKK in Iran). It is unclear exactly what the commission will do. However, Turkish officials reported that there are groups in Iran that have called for "joint operations" (ie, Turkish and Iranian troops operating together) against Kurdish separatists. Approximately four million Kurds live in Iran. Six million Kurds live in Iraq. From twelve to fifteen million (depending on the source of the figures) live in Turkey. [emphasis added]

Secession breeds secessionism. One country or one group secedes and if they achieve any degree of success, it can often start a chain reaction. We saw this in Yugoslavia starting with the Slovenians just setting off a chain reaction all through the other Yugoslav communities. And we've seen it elsewhere in the world, in the Caucuses, for example.

The paper urges a "surge" of many thousands more US troops into Baghdad beginning in March, 2007 for one more grand roll of the iron dice. The concept seems to be based on the notion that Shia militias exist because of Sunni violence against them rather than as expressions of a Shia drive to political dominance in Iraq. Based on that belief the authors seem to believe that if the additional US and Iraqi forces to be employed in the Capital area defeat (destroy?) the Sunni insurgent groups, then the Shia militia armies will "wither away" from a lack of need. I do not think that belief is justified.

[...] The carnage implicit in this concept would be appalling. The authors have much to say about the consequences of defeat in Iraq, but, I wonder if they have contemplated what it would be like to fail in their climactic battle and still be required by '43 to stay in Iraq.

First, putting aside all the nice langauge and pretty diagrams, Kagan's plan is for the destruction and demolition of the suburbs where Shia reside, and the killing of every male of military age they can find, armed or not.

That is what the phrases "Rapid Clearing operations" and "Disarm the militias" means. It means genocide and war crimes.

It will start with encirclement or a given suburb to prevent escape and then commence with artillery firing cluster munitions, followed by tanks, bulldozers and mounted troops whose mission is to kill anything that moves.

Those that survive will be a few women and children, and Kagan's plan is that they will only be assisted to reconstruct their existence if they promise to be good.