The Possum Bistro

Exactly how I reacted when I took all of late afternoon and early evening, pre- and post-dinner to pore through the Iraq Study Group's grand masterpiece, which was released earlier today. I can't keep track of the number of respected blogs that have more or less torn asunder the Hans-Christian-Andersen-worthy assumptions upon which a considerable portion of this report is based. It does make for a good read if you want to know about technical issues that the ISG (fortunately) cannot dispute due to cold, hard facts and statistics. But anything about foreign policy, you won't find a better piece of fiction than this.

Most of the issues have been the subject of intense discourse at EB, BC, American Future and the blogs on Watcher of Weasels' dependable list, so here's some of my own observations and comments about the report.

ISG Report 2006
Contentious issues

1. Assessment

   1. “Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq...he has been the most influential leader in his country...his words have not succeeded in preventing intra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis”

      1. self-contradictory remark – Sistani's refusal to engage actively in moderating the Sadrist/Badrist agendas means that no matter his charismatic authority that he may possess, it now counts for much less

   2. little more than a passing reference to the Kurdish peshmerga, and the possibility that their help could be enlisted

   3. “No country in the region wants a chaotic Iraq...some are undercutting its stability”

      1. the penchant for contradiction, or just plain lack of coherence in the argument does not bode well for the ISG

   4. recognising the threat of Turkey going after the PKK across the border, but any solution?

      1. Iran and Turkey have engaged in cooperation to do so – more Iranian intervention can't be good

      2. what does Iran envisage through this move? Stir more sectarianism between the Kurds and lead them into civil war with the Shiites?

      3. Reveals the invidious nature of Iranian intentions: not to stabilise Iraq, but to make it wholly ungovernable and turn it into a proxy state like Lebanon

   5. “The Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose order amid anarchy. Freedoms might be lost.”

      1. and we're still concerned about freedom without stability? If you mean freedom to be afraid, to kill, to incite hatred – then yes, we might as well leave now
         
         

2. A New Approach

   1. note that the ISG does not explicitly name STUS (states that undermine stability) in the same sentence as when it mentions Iran/Syria

      1. vague references to Iranian/Syrian “leverage”, but somehow conveniently dodges the reality of the situation

   2. “If the government in Baghdad pursues a path of national reconciliation with the Sunnis, the Saudis could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda in Iraq. They could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, the Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate.”

      1. too many what-ifs, and the possibility of the initial suggestion being highly unlikely, throwing the entire structure of argument into disarray

      2. why would the Saudis want to stop funding Wahhabism?

   3. RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries—for instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq could also become members.

      1. Convening Iran, Syria, China and Russia under a single committee should be interesting – keeping each of their interests as divergent as possible, then exploiting pre-existing dichotomies in order to dissolve a united front against international crises like the Iranian nuclear crisis, Russian bullying of ex-Soviet satellite states

      2. one can be pretty certain that such a voting/advisory bloc will inevitably hamper diplomatic discourse and decisive action – do we need another UN?

   4. “Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions.”

      1. without preconditions? That is about the most ridiculous statement I've ever heard: without demanding anything from Iran and Syria, while we give them carte blanche to perpetuate anarchy and chaos in Iraq?

   5. “An Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of the world Iran’s rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to its isolation.”

      1. like “isolation” did anything for Iran or the UN – are they expecting Iran to cower under the threat of sanctions and international condemnation and scorn?

   6. “Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both countries have important interests in the region that could be enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s.”

      1. by “effectively”, you mean how Lebanon has been tormented and subjugated under Syrian power till the present?

   7. “The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set forth in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and in the principle of “land for peace.””

      1. the madness continues – since when has that strategy worked? Look at Gaza and Lebanon; ceasefires simply serve as time periods for terrorists to rearm and recover their losses – why are we accommodating their operational delays?

   8. “A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis in November 2006.”

      1. which ceasefire? I couldn't keep track

   9. “It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation.”

      1. and so has Iran in appealing directly to the citizens of the US, just like how Wilson appealed to the Italians and bypassed the internal sovereignty of Sonnino and Vittorio Orlando post-1918; how Ho Chih Minh appealed to American progressives during the Vietnam War

      2. allowing others to speak for Iraq at this point in time would result in dangerous consequences with regard to whomever would be viewed as the champion of Iraqi nationalism – Ahmadinejad? Assad? Or Maliki?

      3. It is absolutely imperative that the Iraqis speak for themselves; any obscurantist attempt to present a murky consensus on how “peace and reconciliation” is to be achieved should be rejected

   10. RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.

       RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground.

       1. Yes, after reading Page 113 of your report, I think you really need to devote significantly greater analytic resources to produce better material than this